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ABSTRACT
How should courts handle interpretive choices, such as when
statutory text strongly points to one statutory meaning but strong
evidence of legislative intent suggests a contradictory statutory
meaning? Courts have addressed this longstanding dilemma
inconsistently. Sometimes courts follow statutory text over
contradictory legislative intent; sometimes they do the exact opposite.
Though reaching contradictory conclusions, many courts facing
interpretive choices have argued that the law of interpretation
provides definitive solutions. This Article argues that the opposite is
true: the law of interpretation generates, rather than resolves,
interpretive choices. When this occurs, legally unconstrained judicial
discretion and extralegal factors, rather than the law of interpretation,
determine legal meaning. While other scholars have focused on the
role of judicial discretion in shaping legal meaning, their analyses
invariably have centered on inherently ambiguous legal texts or
legislative histories. This Article, by contrast, demonstrates how, in
cases of interpretive choice, unique features of the law of
interpretation turn unambiguous legal texts and legislative histories
into ambiguous statutes.
This Article also explores how courts facing interpretive choices
misrepresent the nature and capacity of the law of interpretation.
Rather than acknowledging the central role of judicial discretion and
extralegal considerations, courts argue that the law of interpretation
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definitively resolves interpretive choices. Rule-of-law values and the
consonant desire to preserve the legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking
prompt courts to opt for this obfuscatory strategy. This Article,
however, offers an alternative strategy—transparent justification—and
explains why the case in favor of transparent justification is much
stronger than most might imagine.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction .............................................................................................584
I. The Unstructured and Internally Conflicted Nature of the
Law of Interpretation...................................................................592
A. Injunctive Principles and Ordering Principles ...................594
B. False Ordering Principles .....................................................601
C. Generating Rather than Resolving Interpretive
Choice.....................................................................................604
II. The Judicial Response to Interpretive Choice:
The Avoidance Maneuver...........................................................607
A. The Avoidance Maneuver in Arlington Central and
Other IDEA § 1415 Cases....................................................608
B. Why Deploy the Avoidance Maneuver? ............................620
III. Transparent Justification as an Alternative to the
Avoidance Maneuver...................................................................627
A. Why Transparent Justification Does Not Undermine
Rule-of-Law Values ..............................................................629
B. Why the Avoidance Maneuver Does Not Enhance
Rule-of-Law Values ..............................................................631
C. How the Avoidance Maneuver Erodes the Honesty
and Quality of Judicial Opinions, Diminishes the
Legitimacy of Courts, and Fails To Constrain
Discretion...............................................................................639
Conclusion................................................................................................644
Appendix..................................................................................................647
INTRODUCTION
What should a court do when the text of a statute points to one
statutory meaning but the evidence of legislative intent suggests an
entirely different statutory meaning? The court could follow the most
natural reading of the text, but that approach would upset the
expectations of the enacting legislature. Or it could adopt a reading
that matches the clearly expressed intent and understanding of the
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enacting legislature, but to do so would be at odds with the statutory
text.
Courts address this longstanding dilemma inconsistently.
Sometimes courts adhere to statutory text over contradictory
legislative intent; sometimes they do the exact opposite. Importantly,
courts grappling with the text-versus-intent dilemma usually argue or
imply that the law of interpretation provides a definitive solution.
This Article argues that the opposite is true: the law of interpretation
generates, rather than resolves, this and similar dilemmas.
1
Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy
serves as a provocative exemplar of this text-versus-intent dilemma,
as well as the law of interpretation’s failure to resolve the dilemma. In
Arlington Central, the Supreme Court held that the fee-shifting
2
provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)
does not permit recovery of expert-witness fees by prevailing
3
plaintiffs. This interpretation followed uncontroversially from the
4
statutory text, which states that prevailing parties may be awarded
5
“reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs.” Justice Alito’s
opinion for the Court emphasized that the statutory text refers only
to recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs; it says nothing about recovery
6
of expert-witness fees. Justice Alito bolstered his textual analysis by
stressing that “costs” is a term of art that is understood to exclude
7
expert-witness fees.

1. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006).
2. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2006).
3. Arlington Cent., 548 U.S. at 304. Arlington Central generated four separate opinions.
Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. at 293304. Justice Ginsberg filed a separate opinion, which
concurred with the result and most of the reasoning of the majority opinion but dissented from
the majority’s invocation of a clear-statement requirement. Id. at 30408 (Ginsberg, J.,
concurring and dissenting in part). A lengthy dissent authored by Justice Breyer was joined by
Justices Stevens and Souter. Id. at 30824 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Souter also submitted
a separate one-paragraph dissent. Id. at 308 (Souter, J., dissenting). This Article will refer to the
opinion authored by Justice Breyer as the dissenting opinion.
4. See id. at 300 (majority opinion) (“[T]he terms of the IDEA overwhelmingly support
the conclusion that prevailing parents may not recover the costs of experts or consultants.”).
5. Id. at 297 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 297, 302. The majority opinion also bolstered its argument with application of a
clear-statement rule: because Congress passed § 1415 of the IDEA pursuant to its Spending
Clause powers, the majority asserted that any condition to state acceptance of federal funds
“must be set out ‘unambiguously.’” Id. at 29596 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). Both Justice Ginsburg’s partial concurrence and Justice
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In response to the majority’s textualist thrust, however, Justice
8
Breyer’s dissenting opinion offered an intentionalist parry. Despite
9
the text, Justice Breyer argued, the provision’s legislative history
demonstrates that Congress understood that the statutory clause in
question would permit prevailing parties to recover not only
10
attorneys’ fees as part of costs, but also expert-witness fees. Most
pertinently, the conference committee’s report stated, “The conferees
intend that the term ‘attorneys’ fees as part of the costs’ include
11
reasonable expenses and fees of expert witnesses . . . .”
Arlington Central offers a stark example of what one
commentator calls “interpretive choice”—a judicial choice between
12
conflicting interpretive approaches or principles. Because the
interpretive choice in Arlington Central is extraordinarily uncluttered,
I use the case throughout this Article to illustrate and examine
13
fundamental features of the law of interpretation.
The choice between textualism and intentionalism, of course, is
just one of many interpretive choices that courts confront. Courts

Breyer’s dissent, however, argued that a clear-statement rule was inapplicable. Id. at 30408
(Ginsburg, J., concurring and dissenting in part); id. at 31618 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
8. See id. at 30824 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
9. Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion acknowledged that a construction permitting
recovery of expert-witness fees would not represent the most linguistically natural reading of
the statutory text. Id. at 319.
10. Id. at 30913. The dissent also argued that the interpretation of IDEA favored by the
majority would discourage parents from enforcing their children’s IDEA rights and would
thereby undermine the statutory purpose of promoting free public education for disabled
children. Id. at 31316.
11. H.R. REP. NO. 99-687, at 5 (1986) (Conf. Rep.). In addition to the conference
committee’s language, the dissent also pointed to several other indicators of legislative intent to
permit expert-witness fee shifting. See infra text accompanying notes 91–94.
12. See Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 76 (2000) (defining
interpretive choice as “the selection of one interpretive doctrine, from a group of candidate
doctrines, in the service of a goal specified by a higher-level theory of interpretation”).
13. Another example involving interpretive choice between clear text and clear,
diametrically opposed legislative intent is an issue that has been litigated in federal courts. See
Adam N. Steinman, “Less” Is “More”?: Textualism, Intentionalism, and a Better Solution to the
Class Action Fairness Act’s Appellate Deadline Riddle, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1183, 1187–88 (2007).
The issue arises out of a section of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1332(d), 1453 (2006), which grants federal appellate courts the uncommon power to hear
immediate appeals of federal district court orders regarding remand of class actions to state
courts. Steinman, supra, at 1187. Unambiguous CAFA statutory text creates a seven-day waiting
period before a litigant may apply for appellate review. Id. But unambiguous evidence of
legislative intent—including a key committee report—indicates that Congress intended to create
a seven-day limitation period for the filing of applications for appellate review. Id.
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may choose purposive or dynamic interpretive approaches and may
utilize different flavors of a particular interpretive approach.
Textualism, for example, is not a monolithic approach but rather a
multiplicity of different approaches using statutory text in different
15
ways. The same holds true for intentionalism. Courts may choose
between honoring an actual expression of the legislature’s intent or
estimating the probable legislative intent regarding an issue that was
16
not originally contemplated by the legislature. Moreover, below the
level of general interpretive approaches, courts may choose from a
diverse array of particularized interpretive canons, maxims, and rules.
For example, when analyzing statutory text, should a court apply the
17
interpretive rule that “all words in a statute must be given effect” or

14. Thus, what should a court do when statutory text suggests one meaning but statutory
purpose would be frustrated by application of that textual meaning? Compare Caminetti v.
United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) (applying a broad, literal meaning deduced from the
statutory text over a more limited meaning derived from the statutory purpose), with Church of
the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) (favoring a limited statutory purpose over
a broader literal meaning based on statutory text). Should courts interpret statutory terms
statically, such that their meaning is frozen at the time of enactment, or dynamically, such that
their meaning shifts over time? Compare People ex rel. Fyfe v. Barnett, 150 N.E. 290, 292 (Ill.
1925) (interpreting a statute statically to read the term “electors” consistently with its meaning
at the time of the statute’s passage, despite a conflict with its contemporary meaning), with
Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 114 A. 825, 829 (Pa. 1921) (interpreting a statute dynamically to
read the term “electors” consistently with its contemporary meaning, despite a conflict with its
meaning at the time of the statute’s passage).
15. For example, as Professor Lawrence Solan emphasizes, courts operating under a
textualist rubric may choose a plain-meaning approach, which he terms a “definitional” or
“ordinary” meaning approach. Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 2027, 203139 (2005).
16. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 70607
(4th ed. 2007) (discussing actual legislative intent and imaginatively reconstructed legislative
intent); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 630 (1990)
(noting that courts using intentionalist interpretation sometimes seek evidence of actual
legislative intent and other times “‘reconstruct’ the answer the enacting Congress would have
given if the interpretive issue had been posed directly”). For a paradigmatic example of
imaginative reconstruction, see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). In CardozaFonseca, the Court drew on various indicia of legislative intent to gauge what Congress would
have intended if it had contemplated the narrow issue before the Court. Id. at 43243. In
contrast, Arlington Central involved direct evidence of congressional intent on the narrow issue
before the Court. See supra note 11.
17. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (citing the canon against
surplusage, which holds that courts must “give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a
statute”).
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the rule that “a word repugnant to the rest of the statute can be
18
ignored”?
19
When faced with interpretive choices, courts vacillate. With
respect to the text-versus-intent dilemma, for example, in one case, a
court will proclaim, “[W]hen the statute’s language is plain, the sole
function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the
20
text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.” In another
case, however, the same court will assert a contrary principle:
“[When] literal application of a statute will produce a result
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters[,] . . . . the
21
intention of the drafters, rather than the strict language, controls.”
Similar contradictions appear in choices between other interpretive
22
approaches, between different versions of the same interpretive
18. See, e.g., Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (stating that the
canon “requiring a court to give effect to each word ‘if possible’ is sometimes offset by the
canon that permits a court to reject words ‘as surplusage’ if ‘inadvertently inserted or if
repugnant to the rest of the statute’” (quoting KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION 525 (1960))).
19. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 112 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In
recent years the Court has vacillated between a purely literal approach to the task of statutory
interpretation and an approach that seeks guidance from historical context, legislative history,
and prior cases identifying the purpose that motivated the legislation.”); Frank B. Cross, The
Significance of Statutory Interpretive Methodologies, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1971, 2001 (2007)
(concluding that the Supreme Court is “quite pluralist in its methods of statutory
interpretation”).
20. Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 (2005) (alteration in original) (quoting
Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also infra note 63.
21. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (quoting Griffin v.
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)) (internal quotation mark omitted); see also
infra note 64.
22. For example, although courts sometimes enunciate the principle that statutory purpose
may trump the plain meaning of statutory text, courts also occasionally state that statutory text
controls even if it would frustrate statutory purpose. Compare Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983) (“The general words used in the clause . . . , taken by themselves, and
literally construed, without regard to the object in view, . . . . in many cases . . . would defeat the
object which the Legislature intended to accomplish. And it is well settled that, in interpreting a
statute, the court will not look merely to a particular clause in which general words may be used,
but will take in connection with it the whole statute . . . and the objects and policy of the law.”
(first and fourth omissions in original) (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 194
(1857)) (internal quotation mark omitted)), and United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S.
534, 543 (1940) (“[E]ven when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an
unreasonable one ‘plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole’ this Court has
followed that purpose, rather than the literal words.” (quoting Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S.
178, 194 (1922))), with Casey, 499 U.S. at 98 (rejecting the argument that a statute should be
construed in accordance with its statutory purpose rather than with the literal meaning of its
text).
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approach, and between fine-grained rules of interpretation.
Professor Karl Llewellyn’s legal-realist critique of statutory
interpretation famously demonstrates that the canons of construction
25
are often inconsistent. The kinds of inconsistencies that Llewellyn
identifies are not limited to the canons, however, but instead are
present even at the level of general interpretive approaches.
This Article addresses the unique structure of the law of
interpretation and explains how this structure often renders the law of
interpretation useless for resolving interpretive choices. The law of
interpretation combines a grab bag of conflicting injunctive principles
with an absence of ordering principles. Injunctive principles instruct
courts on how to interpret statutes. Ordering principles establish
hierarchies of use for these injunctive principles. Because the law of
interpretation lacks a hierarchy for ordering its injunctive principles,
it is incapable of identifying a single legally superior interpretation
among two or more rival interpretations. Instead, the law of
interpretation often identifies multiple interpretations of equal legal
validity. Thus, the law of interpretation not only fails to resolve
interpretive choices, but in fact accomplishes the exact opposite: it
generates interpretive choices. When this occurs, elements outside of
the law of interpretation—generally, legally unconstrained judicial
discretion and extralegal factors—necessarily determine which among
multiple legally sanctioned interpretations a court will select. In
Arlington Central, for example, the Court did not employ textualist
over intentionalist interpretive principles because the law of
interpretation so prescribed. Instead, the Court did so because the

23. The law of interpretation encompasses both plain-meaning and ordinary-meaning
textualism, and the Supreme Court has used both at different times, or even in different
opinions in the same case. See Solan, supra note 15, at 203236 (discussing the use of plainmeaning and ordinary-meaning textualism in Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993)).
24. For example, federal courts may choose between different versions of the same canon
of construction, such as the rule of lenity. Specifically, the majority opinion in Muscarello v.
United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998), cited a narrow version of the rule of lenity applicable only if a
court “can make ‘no more than a guess as to what Congress intended,’” id. at 138 (quoting
United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 499 (1997)), whereas the dissenting opinion cited a broader
version of the rule that applies unless “text, structure, and history fail to establish that the
Government’s position is unambiguously correct,” id. at 148 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Similarly,
federal courts may choose from at least three different versions of the avoidance canon. See
Gilbert Lee, Comment, How Many Avoidance Canons Are There After Clark v. Martinez?, 10
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 193, 20220 (2007) (describing the serious-constitutional-doubts, clearaffirmative-intention, and lowest-common-denominator canons of avoidance).
25. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).
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five Justices joining the majority opinion exercised legally
unconstrained discretion and concluded that statutory text should
trump legislative intent in that particular case.
Many other commentators have explored the role of judicial
26
discretion in legal interpretation, invariably focusing their analyses
27
on the inherent ambiguity of legal texts or legislative histories. The
novel argument offered here is that legally unconstrained judicial
discretion and extralegal factors can dominate legal interpretation
even when the underlying legal materials—statutory text and
legislative history—are themselves clear and unambiguous. In other
words, the law of interpretation not only fails to deal with inherently
ambiguous statutory material, but it also turns unambiguous statutory
material into ambiguous statutes.
Second, this Article focuses on how courts respond to cases that
present interpretive choices. Simply stated, courts regularly employ
an avoidance maneuver: they avoid acknowledging that the law of
interpretation necessitates legally unconstrained choices among
injunctive interpretive principles and deny that judicial discretion and
extralegal factors even play a role in resolving interpretive choices.
Instead, courts routinely contend or imply that the law of
interpretation imposes ordering principles that establish hierarchies
of injunctive interpretive principles. Once a court posits or presumes
that the law of interpretation prefers certain interpretive principles, it
can cast a particular statutory interpretation—not coincidentally, the
one chosen by the court—as compelled by the law of interpretation.
Arlington Central demonstrates this phenomenon. Both the
majority and dissenting opinions in Arlington Central avoided
acknowledging the role of judicial discretion and extralegal
26. A recent, thoughtful meditation on judicial discretion lists Professor Ronald Dworkin,
Justice Benjamin Cardozo, and Professor Ahron Barak among the “countless” authors of works
on “discretion in the judicial process.” A. David Pardo, Judicial Discretion in Talmudic Times
and the Modern Era, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 429, 430 n.4 (2009).
27. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 2027, 2034 (2002) (arguing that courts should respond to statutory indeterminacy by
adopting interpretations that are consistent with the present society’s “enactable political
preferences” rather than the preferences of the enacting Congress); Amanda Frost, Certifying
Questions to Congress, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 923 (2007) (discussing statutory indeterminacy
and arguing that courts should be permitted to refer ambiguous statutory-interpretation issues
back to Congress); John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2408
(2003) (discussing how textualist judges should exercise discretion when facing ambiguous
statutory texts); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115
HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2086 (2002) (proposing a statutory code of permissible principles of
interpretation in response to the “inevitable ambiguities” of statutes).
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considerations in determining the outcome. They did this by
suggesting that the law of interpretation provided a definitive answer
to the text-versus-intent dilemma presented by the case.
Third, this Article explores whether the avoidance maneuver
offers the optimal response for courts facing interpretive choices. The
central problem with the avoidance maneuver is that courts
employing it misrepresent the law of interpretation. In Arlington
Central, both opinions distorted the law of interpretation because
both suggested that it favored one interpretive approach—textualism
or intentionalism—over another. The law of interpretation, however,
contains no ordering principles that establish a definitive hierarchy
between textualist and intentionalist interpretive approaches. Instead,
the law of interpretation sanctions conflicting interpretive principles
and grants neither approach a definitive legal trump over the other.
As an alternative to the avoidance maneuver, courts could
confront interpretive choices with a strategy of transparent
justification. Under this strategy, courts would admit that the law of
interpretation generates interpretive choices and would then openly
explain the extralegal factors motivating them to choose one legally
valid interpretation over another interpretation of equal legal
validity.
Both rule-of-law values and the consonant desire to preserve the
legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking might be seen as counseling in
favor of the avoidance maneuver and against transparent justification.
But the rule-of-law justification for the avoidance maneuver is
surprisingly weak, and the case in favor of transparent justification is
much stronger than many imagine. Cases presenting interpretive
choices cannot be decided in accordance with rule-of-law values. The
avoidance maneuver cannot alter the inescapable reality that judicial
discretion and extralegal factors will be determinative in these cases.
Rather than enhancing or even preserving the legitimacy of courts
and judicial decisionmaking, the avoidance maneuver merely drapes
judicial discretion in an unconvincing rule-of-law façade. By contrast,
transparent justification would do no discernible damage to the
legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking. Courts using transparent
justification would confront interpretive choices with candor and
completeness. Because lawyers, litigants, and attentive segments of
the general public already comprehend that the law of interpretation
alone cannot adjudicate interpretive choices, the candor of
transparent justification would not produce legitimacy-eroding
effects.
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Part I explains why the law of interpretation generates, rather
than resolves, interpretive choices and thus why it permits legally
unconstrained discretion and extralegal factors to be outcome
determinative in cases involving interpretive choice. Part II illustrates
how courts deploy the avoidance maneuver and how they routinely
claim that the law of interpretation resolves interpretive choices by
identifying legally superior statutory interpretations. Part III
addresses the merits and demerits of both the avoidance maneuver
and transparent justification. Additionally, Part III argues that courts
should more readily recognize the drawbacks of the avoidance
maneuver and should be more receptive to using transparent
justification in cases of interpretive choice.
I. THE UNSTRUCTURED AND INTERNALLY CONFLICTED NATURE
OF THE LAW OF INTERPRETATION
The law of interpretation sanctions conflicting interpretive
principles and treats them as hierarchic equals. As a result, the law of
interpretation generates but cannot resolve interpretive choices.
Instead, unfettered judicial discretion and extralegal factors resolve
interpretive choices.
In Arlington Central, the Justices faced an interpretive choice
between textualist and intentionalist interpretive principles. Because
the law of interpretation treats these principles as hierarchic equals, it
is ultimately incapable of resolving the interpretive choice. Thus, the
law of interpretation could not have been the decisive element that
produced the majority and dissenting interpretations of IDEA § 1415.
Instead, extralegal factors—perhaps the Justices’ substantive policy
preferences, their personally held philosophies of interpretation, or
other idiosyncratic factors—resolved the interpretive choice and
determined the outcome of the case.
My argument goes beyond the pedestrian point that judicial
discretion is often the deciding factor in legal interpretation cases. To
be sure, judicial discretion is the determinative factor when statutory
28
materials exhibit inherent ambiguity. The argument offered here,

28. The final contours of statutes with ambiguous text, for example, will be drawn by an
inescapable exercise of judicial discretion. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 4147 (1994) (arguing that textualist principles do not limit
judicial discretion because they cannot always clarify ambiguous statutory provisions); John F.
Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
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however, has nothing to do with cases involving inherent linguistic
ambiguity or open-textured terminology. To the contrary, I argue that
legally unconstrained judicial discretion driven by extralegal
considerations determines outcomes in any case of interpretive
choice, even when the statutory material itself is relatively free of
inherent ambiguity or open-textured terminology.
Thus, in Arlington Central, the relevant fee-shifting provision in
IDEA § 1415 is marked by a very low degree of ambiguity. The
statutory text refers only to recovery of “reasonable attorneys’ fees as
29
part of the costs.” It does not mention expert-witness fees.
Moreover, “costs” is a term of art that does not include expert30
witness fees. The evidence in the record of legislative history is
equally unambiguous in indicating that Congress intended for the
words “reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs” to permit
recovery of expert-witness fees. Principally, the conference report
stated that “[t]he conferees intend[ed for] the term ‘attorneys’ fees as
part of the costs’ [to] include reasonable expenses and fees of expert
31
witnesses.” Despite this lack of inherent ambiguity in the statutory
materials, legally unconstrained judicial discretion determined which
of two unambiguous but conflicting meanings prevailed.
How could the law of interpretation fail to establish a hierarchy
between textualist and intentionalist interpretive norms? More
broadly, how could the law of interpretation generate, rather than
resolve, interpretive choices between interpretive principles? The
answer lies in the structure—or, perhaps more accurately, the
antistructure—of the law of interpretation. The law of interpretation
is not a neatly systematized hierarchy of principles. It is instead a
disorderly and unstructured grab bag of tools—featuring interpretive
approaches, canons, and other rules—from which courts may draw to
suit their needs. The law of interpretation lacks structure because it
combines a varied and often conflicting body of injunctive interpretive
principles with an almost complete lack of ordering principles for
organizing and prioritizing those injunctive principles. The lack of
ordering principles leaves the law of interpretation without rules for

1648, 1655 (2001) (“Ambiguous language necessarily vests judges with some degree of
policymaking discretion . . . .”).
29. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 297 (2006).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 312 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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resolving conflicts between injunctive principles, such as opposing
textualist and intentionalist principles.
A. Injunctive Principles and Ordering Principles
The law of interpretation is primarily composed of rules that can
be labeled injunctive interpretive principles. Injunctive interpretive
principles resemble commands, directives, or imperatives. They
instruct or command courts engaged in the interpretive enterprise.
Courts have developed injunctive interpretive principles at two levels
of generality. First, at a high level of generality, courts have devised
32
and employed different general interpretive approaches. Textualism
and intentionalism, on display in Arlington Central, are the most
33
frequently used approaches. Purposive and dynamic approaches,
34
however, are also regularly employed. These different interpretive
approaches offer courts guidance on the general objectives of the
interpretive enterprise. Textualist injunctive principles establish that
when interpreting statutes, courts should strive to discern the
35
meaning of the statutes’ enacted and officially adopted words.
Intentionalist injunctive principles, by contrast, maintain that courts
should seek first and foremost to interpret statutes in accordance with

32. See Carlos E. González, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REV. 585,
594624 (1996) (reviewing the textualist, intentionalist, purposive, and dynamic interpretive
approaches).
33. Frost, supra note 27, at 2 (referring to textualism and intentionalism as “the two most
widely accepted interpretive theories”); John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91
VA. L. REV. 419, 41920 (2005) (naming textualism and intentionalism as the most frequently
used interpretive methodologies).
34. On dynamic interpretation, see ESKRIDGE, supra note 28, at 4880. On purposive
interpretation, see AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW 83304 (2005);
WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 11549 (1999); and Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role
of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 6667 (2002). For arguments that
pragmatic- or practical-reasoning approaches should perhaps be separate interpretive
approaches, see, for example, RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 23065 (2008);
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42
STAN. L. REV. 321, 353–62 (1990); and Daniel A. Farber, Do Theories of Statutory Interpretation
Matter?: A Case Study, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1409, 141416 (2000).
35. See González, supra note 32, at 596 (“The common thread linking the family of textual
theories of statutory interpretation is their uniform reliance on the words of statutes as an
interpretive guide.”); Manning, supra note 33, at 420 (“[T]extualism . . . is associated with the
basic proposition that judges must seek and abide by the public meaning of the enacted
text . . . .”); see also Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 416–17 (2005)
(arguing that textualism is subtle rather than simplistic and, in the end, is not that different from
an intentionalist approach).
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the intent of the legislative body, even if that intent is inconsistent
36
with, or imperfectly conveyed by, a statute’s textual provisions.
Second, at a lower level of generality, courts have devised and
employed a long list of injunctive interpretive canons, maxims,
37
presumptions, and rules. Many canons are meant to assist courts in
38
deciphering the meaning of statutory texts. Other canons assist
39
courts in determining the most probable legislative intent. Still other
canons imbue the law of interpretation with substantive presumptions
40
or biases. Like the broad interpretive approaches, the narrow
canons, maxims, and rules instruct courts on how to conduct and
engage in the interpretive enterprise. For example, one commonly
used principle explains: “Where general words follow specific words
in a statutory enumeration, the general words [should be] construed
to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated
41
by the preceding specific words.” Another less well-known principle
instructs courts to interpret ambiguous statutes “to avoid
unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other
nations” and to “assume that legislators take account of the legitimate
sovereign interests of other nations when they write American
42
laws.”
Though the above review traces only the broadest outlines of the
law of interpretation, it should be clear that the body of injunctive
43
interpretive principles is vast and varied. In contrast to this body of
injunctive interpretive principles, the law of interpretation is almost
completely devoid of ordering principles—rules to order, organize,

36. ESKRIDGE, supra note 28, at 14; González, supra note 32, at 605; Steinman, supra note
13, at 1197.
37. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 16, app. B at 1941 (providing a comprehensive list of
the canons of statutory interpretation).
38. Id. app. B at 1923.
39. Id. app. B at 2528.
40. Id. app. B at 2934.
41. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 11415 (2001) (first alteration in
original) (quoting 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 47.17 (5th ed. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (employing the
ejusdem generis canon of construction).
42. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004).
43. The scope of this body of injunctive interpretive principles is so vast, varied, and
complex that American law schools increasingly offer courses devoted substantially or entirely
to judicial interpretation of statutes. Ethan J. Leib, Adding Legislation Courses to the First-Year
Curriculum, 58 J. LEGAL EDUC. 166, 168 n.9 (2008); Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction,
108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1904 (2008).
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prioritize, and coordinate often-discordant injunctive interpretive
44
principles.
The key difference between injunctive and ordering principles
lies in the following idea: Injunctive principles instruct courts on the
methods they should use to interpret statutes and statutory material.
They are the tools available to courts charged with the task of
untangling the meaning of statutes. Ordering principles, by
comparison, define which injunctive principles possess primacy,
priority, or hierarchic superiority in any given interpretive situation.
They instruct courts not on how to interpret statutes, but rather on
which interpretive tools to use or not use in a particular case or
circumstance. Ordering principles establish that certain injunctive
interpretive principles trump other injunctive interpretive principles,
at least in particular situations. In Arlington Central, an ordering
principle would have determined which injunctive interpretive
principle—textualist or intentionalist—should have taken precedence
and governed the Court’s interpretation of IDEA § 1415’s fee-shifting
provision. This kind of ordering principle is precisely what the law of
interpretation lacks. Simply stated, no unequivocal ordering rule
exists to establish a hierarchy between textualist and intentionalist
injunctive principles.
Judges, however, do not acknowledge this feature of the law of
interpretation. Instead, they often proclaim the opposite—that the
law of interpretation dictates particular orderings of injunctive
interpretive principles. For example, Justice Scalia argues that the law
of interpretation grants paramount privilege to statutory text over
45
conflicting legislative history. In fact, Justice Scalia incorrectly
describes the law of interpretation. Despite the forceful protestations
44. Perhaps in response to this phenomenon, some scholars have called for a systematized
code, a restatement of statutory interpretation, or a stare decisis approach to rules of
interpretation. See, e.g., Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory
Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1867 (2008) (supporting the application of stare
decisis to principles of statutory interpretation); Gary E. O’Connor, Restatement (First) of
Statutory Interpretation, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 333, 334 (2004) (arguing for the
creation of a restatement of statutory-interpretation principles); Rosenkranz, supra note 27, at
2087 (arguing for a legislatively created code of statutory interpretation).
45. See, e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 122 (2007) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (“The only sure indication of what Congress intended is what Congress enacted;
and even if there is a difference between the two, the rule of law demands that the latter
prevail.”); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Supreme Court has “adopted a regular method for interpreting the meaning of language in a
statute” that embraces textualist principles and rejects reliance on legislative history); ANTONIN
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 2937 (1997).
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46

found in many of Justice Scalia’s opinions, the law of interpretation
does not definitively require judges to privilege statutory text over
conflicting legislative intent. To the contrary, the law of interpretation
47
manifestly permits courts to go beyond statutory text. More
precisely, the law of interpretation has long sanctioned two conflicting
injunctive interpretive principles. On the one hand, many cases stand
for the proposition that when statutory text and legislative intent
48
stand in conflict, the text must prevail. On the other hand, numerous
other cases stand for the proposition that legislative intent may trump
49
contrary statutory text.
Justice Scalia’s preference for text over legislative history as an
aid in statutory interpretation may or may not be based on sound
reasoning. My contention, however, is that his preference is entirely
personal and, therefore, extralegal. When Justice Scalia drafts an
opinion arguing that the law of interpretation requires courts to
enforce statutory text regardless of contrary legislative intent, he
writes not based on what the law of interpretation actually is, but
rather on what he believes it ought to be. In such situations, he is
exercising unadulterated judicial discretion based on personal
50
preference and conviction rather than legal compulsion.

46. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 16, at 989 (listing cases in which Justice Scalia has
criticized the use of legislative history); see also, e.g., Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489,
50911 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (objecting to the Court’s use of the legislative record to
corroborate its interpretation that was based on statutory text alone); Koons Buick Pontiac
GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 76 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should
not favor legislative intent over the enacted statutory text).
47. Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing
Statutes in the 1988–89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 280
(1990) (stating that the practice of referring to a record of legislative history “can be traced back
at least a century”); Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in
the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 206–13 (1983) (tracing the use of legislative
history in Supreme Court decisions).
48. See infra text accompanying note 63.
49. See infra text accompanying note 64.
50. Indeed, eight Supreme Court Justices joined an opinion repudiating Justice Scalia’s
entreaties to avoid using legislative history. Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597,
61012 n.4 (1991). Moreover, even the Roberts Court, which features several textualist-leaning
Justices, continues to refer to legislative history regularly when interpreting statutes. See James
J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Legislative History? Patterns of Supreme
Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220, 22223 (2006) (finding
that the Supreme Court’s reliance on legislative history persists, although it is less frequent than
during the Burger Court era, and concluding that nearly 50 percent of the decline is attributable
to Justices Scalia and Thomas).
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I do not mean to suggest that Justice Scalia acts improperly when
he exercises this sort of judicial discretion. Legal reform, including
reform of the law of interpretation, falls squarely within the
jurisdiction of Supreme Court Justices. My aim is simply to
underscore the point that Justice Scalia’s rejection of legislative
history is based not on the extant law of interpretation, but rather on
his own preferences regarding how the law of interpretation should
be altered. Because the law of interpretation lacks an ordering
principle that definitively determines whether text trumps contrary
intent, or vice versa, the factor that determines whether Justice Scalia
will consult a legislative record is not internal to the law of
interpretation. Instead, extralegal considerations, such as Justice
Scalia’s own personal preferences regarding interpretive
methodology, will be determinative.
Although the law of interpretation lacks ordering principles, such
hierarchy-imposing principles are common in other areas of the law.
On a macro level, ordering principles dictate that constitutional
norms trump conflicting statutory norms, which in turn trump
conflicting administrative norms, which in turn trump conflicting
51
common-law norms. Similarly, the American federal system includes
an ordering principle, memorialized in the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution, which establishes that federal law trumps conflicting
52
state law.
Ordering principles commonly operate at the micro level, too.
Thus, within constitutional law, ordering principles dictate that
certain constitutional norms must trump other constitutional norms
when the two conflict. For example, Article I of the Constitution
grants Congress a broadly interpreted power to pass statutes that
53
regulate interstate commerce. When an exercise of Congress’s
Commerce Clause power violates the First Amendment’s free-speech,
assembly, or religious-practice protections, those First Amendment
54
protections trump Congress’s Article I legislative powers. As
constitutional norms, both the Commerce Clause and the First
51. See Carlos E. González, The Logic of Legal Conflict: The Perplexing Combination of
Formalism and Anti-Formalism in Adjudication of Conflicting Legal Norms, 80 OR. L. REV. 447,
533 (2001) (illustrating the hierarchy of legal norms graphically).
52. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981).
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
54. See González, supra note 51, at 524 (arguing that under the chronologic axiom, when in
conflict, rights-granting clauses in the Bill of Rights trump power-granting clauses in the
Constitution’s main body).
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Amendment are norms of the highest rank. Yet an ordering principle
clearly establishes that, in cases of conflict, the First Amendment
trumps the Commerce Clause. Ordering principles establish
hierarchies of norms in the law of civil procedure as well. Under the
Erie doctrine, an ordering principle dictates that in federal diversityjurisdiction litigation, federal procedural rules trump conflicting state
procedural rules. Thus, when federal courts adjudicate claims based
on state substantive law, they apply federal, rather than conflicting
55
state, procedural law.
Ordering principles are useful in areas in which legal norms are
likely to come into conflict, such as conflicts between constitutional
rights and powers, between federal and state substantive law, or
between federal and state rules of civil procedure. In these areas,
ordering principles prevent chaotic and inconsistent application of
conflicting legal norms. But for the existence of a clear and
unquestionable ordering principle granting First Amendment
protections superiority over Article I legislative powers, in cases of
conflict, courts would have no legalistic means for definitively
adjudicating the constitutionality of an act of Congress that impairs
First Amendment protections.
For example, suppose Congress were to pass a statute
prohibiting employers from requiring their employees to work more
than four hours on days of religious Sabbath. As long as Congress
made a serious and plausible finding that the prohibition affected
interstate commerce, such a statute would fall within Congress’s
56
Commerce Clause power. The statute, however, would stand in
conflict with the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause
57
protections. Without an ordering principle to establish a hierarchy
55. See Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006) (providing that state law applies
“except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise
require or provide”); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“Except in matters
governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case
[based on diversity of citizenship] is the law of the state.”).
56. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 1622 (2005) (reviewing the Commerce Clause
doctrine and reaffirming that, under the Commerce Clause, Congress may regulate activities
that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce in the aggregate); United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 11827 (1941) (holding that, under the Commerce Clause, Congress may regulate
employment conditions such as wages and hours when they affect interstate commerce).
57. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 709–11 (1985) (holding that a state law
prohibiting employers from requiring employees to work on the Sabbath violated the
Establishment Clause because it favored or advanced religion over other interests); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–14 (1971) (holding that state laws providing for the funding of
secular subjects in religious schools violate the Establishment Clause).
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between First Amendment protections and any conflicting exercises
of Article I legislative powers, neither could claim a definitive trump
over the other. Courts could vacillate in their outcomes. One court
could find such a statute unconstitutional because it violates a First
Amendment protection, even though it was passed under a valid
exercise of the Commerce Clause. This court would be giving First
Amendment protections priority over Commerce Clause legislative
power. By contrast, a different court—or even the same court at a
later date—could find that the statute is valid and constitutional. That
court would be giving the Commerce Clause power priority over First
Amendment protections.
The latter holding seems both strange and mistaken. But the
reason it seems strange and mistaken is that a universally
recognizable and unimpeachable ordering principle establishes a
hierarchy. Every constitutional lawyer would acknowledge that First
Amendment protections trump conflicting exercises of Commerce
Clause legislative power. Under this ordering principle, Congress is
permitted to pass laws that substantially affect interstate commerce,
as long as those laws do not infringe First Amendment—or other—
constitutional rights and protections.
A review of litigated issues will reveal the presence or absence of
ordering principles. In areas in which ordering principles are present,
litigation will not dwell on ordering issues but instead will focus on
whether the case presents a conflict of norms. In a case involving the
Commerce Clause power and the Establishment Clause protection,
for example, the ordering principle granting the latter primacy over
the former is entrenched, clear, and understood. Litigants therefore
will not bother to contest the existence or applicability of that
ordering principle. Instead, they will argue over whether a conflict is
present or whether the law, passed under Congress’s Commerce
Clause powers, infringes on Establishment Clause protections.
Thus, for the statute prohibiting employers from requiring
employees to work on days of religious Sabbath, the key litigation
question will be whether such a statute violates the Establishment
Clause’s prohibition on laws favoring religious interests. If it does—
58
and yes, it does —the applicable ordering principle indisputably
privileges the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause protections
over Congress’s legislative power under the Commerce Clause. The

58. Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. at 71011.
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presence of an entrenched and unequivocal ordering principle takes
the issue of whether the Establishment Clause protections trump a
conflicting exercise of Commerce Clause legislative powers off the
table, thereby narrowing the litigation to a different issue: whether
the exercise of Commerce Clause legislative powers in question
conflicts with the Establishment Clause protections.
Evidence from litigation supports the claim that the law of
interpretation lacks ordering principles. Arguments in statutoryinterpretation cases often focus on which injunctive interpretive rule
holds a paramount status. Thus, in cases in which statutory text and
legislative intent stand in conflict, the issue of whether text should
59
trump intent, or vice versa, is very much front and center. In
Arlington Central, the majority and dissenting opinions were divided
60
on this central legal issue. If there had been a clearly established
ordering principle to decide the issue, the opinions would not have
needed to argue the point.
B. False Ordering Principles
The law of interpretation is almost all judge-made law; its
61
elements are found in, and are the product of, court opinions. The
courts have not developed any set of positive norms to organize,
prioritize, or rank the law of interpretation’s vast and varied array of
injunctive principles. Simply stated, the reporters are full of injunctive
interpretive principles, but devoid of ordering principles that would
serve to place the injunctive principles in an identifiable and
uncontroversial hierarchy.
Many statements in cases look like, or at least purport to operate
as, ordering principles establishing the hierarchic superiority of
certain injunctive interpretive principles over others. Close
examination, however, shows that these statements do not operate as
ordering principles and do not establish hierarchies of injunctive
principles. They instead constitute nothing more than standard
conflicts and contradictions between injunctive interpretive
principles.

59. The lower federal court cases that deal with IDEA § 1415 and the shifting of expertwitness fees exemplify this phenomenon. See infra text accompanying notes 7299.
60. See infra text accompanying notes 95111.
61. O’Connor, supra note 44, at 336 (stating that “most of the ‘rules’ of statutory
interpretation are judge-made”); Rosenkranz, supra note 27, at 2086 (observing that courts have
developed principles of statutory interpretation).
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For example, numerous case authorities seem to suggest that text
trumps conflicting legislative intent. Thus, as mentioned in the
62
Introduction, many case authorities endorse the proposition that
“when the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—
at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to
63
enforce it according to its terms.” In isolation, this kind of statement
might appear to represent an ordering principle that unequivocally
establishes the primacy of statutory text—at least unambiguous
statutory text—over conflicting legislative intent.
Other case authorities, however, undermine any ordering
function this sort of statement might perform. Many cases
communicate the notion that when “literal application of a statute
will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its
drafters[,] . . . . the intention of the drafters, rather than the strict
64
language, controls.” This statement, if viewed in isolation, also looks
62. See supra text accompanying note 20.
63. Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 (2005); see also Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S.
526, 534 (2004) (“It is well established that ‘when the statute’s language is plain, the sole
function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to
enforce it according to its terms.’” (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters
Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000))); Hartford Underwriters, 530 U.S. at 6 (repeating the same quotation
from United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989)); Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999) (“As in any case of statutory construction, our analysis
begins with ‘the language of the statute.’ And where the statutory language provides a clear
answer, it ends there as well.” (citation omitted) (quoting Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling
Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992))); Estate of Cowart, 505 U.S. at 475 (“In a statutory construction
case, the beginning point must be the language of the statute, and when a statute speaks with
clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute’s meaning, in all but the most extraordinary
circumstance, is finished.”); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (“It is
elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in
which the act is framed, and if that is plain . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it
according to its terms.”).
64. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. at 242 (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458
U.S. 564, 571 (1982)) (internal quotation mark omitted); see also Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v.
Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 10405 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[I]n rare cases the literal
application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its
drafters, and those intentions must be controlling.”); Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport,
495 U.S. 552, 565 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The strict language of the Bankruptcy
Code does not control, even if the statutory language has a ‘plain’ meaning, if the application of
that language ‘will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters.’”
(quoting Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. at 242)); Griffin, 458 U.S. at 571 (“Nevertheless, in rare
cases the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the
intentions of its drafters, and those intentions must be controlling.”); Lionberger v. Rouse, 76
U.S. (9. Wall.) 468, 475 (1869) (“It is a universal rule in the exposition of statutes that the intent
of the law, if it can be clearly ascertained, shall prevail over the letter, and this is especially true
where the precise words, if construed in their ordinary sense, would lead to manifest injustice.”);
United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 48687 (1868) (“General terms should be so
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as though it establishes an ordering principle, albeit an ordering
principle that demands the opposite hierarchy from that demanded
by the prior principle—legislative intent over conflicting statutory
text.
The simultaneous existence of case authorities purporting to
establish both textualism and intentionalism as hierarchically superior
does not demonstrate that the law of interpretation indeed includes
some sort of text-versus-intent ordering principle. To the contrary, it
undermines any claim of superior hierarchic status and demonstrates
the irreconcilably conflicted nature of the law of interpretation’s
injunctive principles. In simple terms, one valid and firmly established
interpretive principle maintains that statutory text trumps conflicting
legislative intent. Another equally valid and firmly established
interpretive principle maintains the exact opposite—that legislative
intent trumps conflicting statutory text. In the end, neither of these
statements operates as an ordering principle capable of setting a
definitive or unequivocal hierarchy between textualist and
intentionalist principles. Both statements are really nothing more
than iterations of two competing injunctive interpretive principles.
With no ordering principle to referee the conflict, these contradictory
65
assertions of normative supremacy merely cancel each other out.
limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It
will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its
language . . . .”); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 631 (1818) (stating that
“general words must not only be limited to cases within the jurisdiction of the state, but also to
those objects to which the legislature intended to apply them”); Eskridge, supra note 16, at 628
n.25 (stating that “[i]n a significant number of cases, the Court has pretty much admitted that it
was displacing plain meaning with apparent legislative intent or purpose gleaned from
legislative history” and citing numerous Supreme Court cases as examples); Manning, supra
note 27, at 2399 & n.36 (listing several Supreme Court cases “sanctioning departures from clear
statutory texts when exceptional circumstances disclosed ‘a clearly expressed legislative
intention to the contrary’” (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447
U.S. 102, 108 (1980))).
65. Nor does the frequency of use of different injunctive principles reveal any sort of
hierarchy of injunctive principles within the law of interpretation. The more frequent use of
some injunctive principles could signal that those principles are simply more popular with
judges. If that is the case, then simply the personal preferences of judges for some injunctive
interpretive principles over others—and not any true ordering principles within the law of
interpretation—is at work.
Greater frequency of use could also signal that courts tend to apply some injunctive
principles in a predictable sequence, and consequently that they apply the first principle in the
sequence with greater frequency. For example, it may be that some courts apply textualism as a
first method and only resort to intentionalist, purposive, or dynamic methods if textualism
produces an unsatisfactory result. So long as textualism often produces satisfactory results, this
sequential formula would result in courts’ relying on textualism more than intentionalism or
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Because the law of interpretation endorses two contrary
injunctive principles and fails to establish a hierarchy between them,
nothing within the law of interpretation compels courts to
consistently apply one injunctive principle over another. As occurred
in Arlington Central, judges who wish to apply a textualist
methodology can rely on the case authorities stating that the sole
function of courts is to apply the plain meaning of statutory text
regardless of conflicting legislative intent. Likewise, judges who wish
to apply an intentionalist methodology can rely on the cases favoring
legislative intent over conflicting statutory text. Neither set of judges
will be able to cite dispositive case authority that unequivocally and
without substantial contradiction ranks one interpretive approach
over the other. In other words, no trump cards that could settle a
disagreement over injunctive principles between these two sets of
judges exist within the law of interpretation.
C. Generating Rather than Resolving Interpretive Choice
So far, this Article has used Arlington Central and its text-versusintent interpretive choice as an exemplar to illustrate two important
features of the law of interpretation. First, the law of interpretation
sanctions numerous injunctive interpretive principles that can
produce divergent statutory interpretations. Second, it lacks any
ordering principles that could determine which injunctive principle
should prevail in cases of conflict.
Because of these two features, the law of interpretation
generates, rather than resolves, instances of interpretive choice.
Perhaps the easiest way to illustrate this point is to imagine a
counterfactual law of interpretation that does not exhibit either of
these two features. Removing either feature would eliminate the
phenomenon of interpretive choice. First, imagine a law of
interpretation that contains just one injunctive approach: interpret all
statutes in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the inscribed and
approved statutory words. True, even this simplified law of
interpretation would not provide all of the answers. Given the
inherent ambiguity of language, courts would still have to determine

dynamism. Nothing in this practice, however, would signal any hierarchic superiority of
textualism over other competing injunctive principles. Whatever the greater frequency with
which some injunctive principles are used, that frequency does not provide ordering principles
that resolve the problem in Arlington Central and discussed in this Article.
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the ordinary meaning of statutory texts under varying circumstances.
But because such a law of interpretation would sanction only one
general interpretive approach, interpretive choice between general
interpretive approaches would be nonexistent. No textualism-versusintentionalism conflict could arise, as intentionalism would not be
67
sanctioned as a valid interpretive method.
Second, imagine a law of interpretation that sanctioned
competing injunctive interpretive principles but that also included a
set of ordering principles establishing clear hierarchies for cases in
which the injunctive principles led to conflicting statutory
interpretations. Here too courts would face no interpretive choices, at
least not in the sense of courts’ choosing to privilege one injunctive
principle over another. In every case in which different injunctive
principles pointed to different statutory interpretations, an ordering
principle would specify the appropriate hierarchy of principles, thus
obviating any need for interpretive choice. In cases in which the text
pointed to one statutory construction and legislative intent to a
different construction, an established and unimpeachable ordering
principle would determine which of the two should control.
The real law of interpretation, however, sanctions competing
68
injunctive interpretive principles and lacks ordering principles. Cases
like Arlington Central are the natural result. In Arlington Central,
textualist principles produced an interpretation of IDEA § 1415 that
denied prevailing plaintiffs the recovery of expert-witness fees,
whereas intentionalist principles led to an interpretation that
permitted the recovery of those fees. Because the law of
interpretation sanctions both textualist and intentionalist
methodologies, both constructions count as plausible and legally
legitimate IDEA § 1415 interpretations.
This situation left the Court with an interpretive choice: Should
the Court enforce the statutory text or the contrary legislative intent?
If the law of interpretation had offered an ordering principle
establishing a definitive hierarchy between statutory text and
66. Courts using textualist methods sometimes disagree on the meaning of statutory text.
See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 126–27, 139 (1998) (interpreting the word
“carries” in a sentencing statute in different text-based ways).
67. Interpretive choices among different textualist injunctive principles, however, would be
possible. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697–
98, 702–03 (1995) (rejecting the lowers court’s usage of noscitur sociis and instead employing the
canon against surplusage).
68. See supra Part I.A.
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legislative intent, the case would have been easy. Whichever
interpretation flowed from the hierarchically superior interpretive
methodology would have been considered legally correct. But the law
of interpretation lacks such an ordering principle, and it therefore
provided no way to determine which interpretive methodology, or
which statutory interpretation, was legally superior.
Because the law of interpretation sanctions competing
methodologies, it generates interpretive choices. By failing to provide
an ordering principle to mediate conflicts between competing
interpretive methodologies, the law of interpretation offers no way to
referee an interpretive choice and identify a single legally superior
interpretation. Thus, in Arlington Central, neither the majority’s
textualist-derived interpretation nor the dissent’s intentionalistderived interpretation could claim a legally superior status. The two
competing interpretive approaches—and two competing IDEA
interpretations—were left in a state of exactly equal hierarchic status
and legal validity.
The presence of two equally valid methodologies generates
uncommon forms of legal ambiguity and judicial discretion not found
in areas of law in which ordering principles are present. First,
consider the manner in which the law of interpretation generates this
form of ambiguity. As I suggest, legal materials themselves may
exhibit an inherent ambiguity stemming from the imprecision of
69
language. The law of interpretation, however, can produce
ambiguity even when the underlying legal materials themselves are
relatively unambiguous. The reason that the meaning of the IDEA
§ 1415 fee-shifting provision was in doubt in Arlington Central had
nothing to do with the IDEA itself. Both its text and its legislative
70
history were relatively unambiguous. Instead, the meaning of the
IDEA § 1415 fee-shifting provision was ambiguous because (1) the
law of interpretation sanctions competing interpretive methodologies,
but (2) it offers no legal formula for determining which interpretive
methodology, and which consequent interpretation, should prevail. In
other words, the law of interpretation transformed unambiguous
71
statutory materials into an ambiguous statute.

69. See supra text accompanying note 28.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 30–32.
71. Compare the ambiguity of the IDEA in Arlington Central with my hypothetical statute
regarding work on the Sabbath. See supra text accompanying notes 50–52. In cases involving a
conflict between the Commerce Clause and a First Amendment protection, an unimpeachable
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As a matter of course, courts often must exercise discretion in
interpreting and applying inherently ambiguous legal materials. The
law of interpretation’s lack of ordering principles, however, offers
courts discretion on a completely separate plane. Because it lacks
ordering principles, the law of interpretation affords courts the legally
unconstrained discretion to choose between conflicting interpretive
principles. Thus, in Arlington Central, should the Court have
employed textualist or intentionalist injunctive interpretive
principles? Because the law of interpretation does not include an
ordering principle that definitively settles this question, the Court
exercised legally unconstrained discretion in deciding whether text
72
trumped conflicting intent, or vice versa.
II. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO INTERPRETIVE CHOICE: THE
AVOIDANCE MANEUVER
In written opinions, judges rarely acknowledge that the law of
interpretation fails to provide definitive answers in cases of
interpretive choice or that factors beyond the law of interpretation
are determinative. Instead, judges respond to interpretive choice by
deploying an avoidance maneuver. The avoidance maneuver comes in
two archetypal variants.
In one archetypal variant, judges will acknowledge that different
injunctive interpretive principles point to different interpretations,
but they will simultaneously deny the existence of an interpretive
choice. Judges will effect this denial by expressly claiming, or
implicitly suggesting, that the law of interpretation favors certain
injunctive interpretive principles over others and, therefore, that it
favors certain statutory interpretations over others. Thus, for the

ordering principle dictates that the latter trumps the former. Any ambiguity in the case would
stem from uncertainty about the contours of the Commerce Clause or the First Amendment.
The question would not be, “Does the Commerce Clause trump the First Amendment, or vice
versa?” An ordering principle unequivocally answers this question. Instead, the question would
be, “Does the First Amendment offer protection against laws prohibiting private employers
from requiring work on the Sabbath?” In Arlington Central, the ambiguity stemmed from the
law of interpretation’s lack of an ordering principle. Should statutory text trump legislative
intent, or vice versa? The law of interpretation left the outcome uncertain.
72. Other areas of law furnish ordering principles and, therefore, limit judicial discretion to
a single plane. Thus, courts have no discretion to determine whether First Amendment
protections or Commerce Clause legislative powers are superior. Because an ordering principle
exists, courts have discretion only on a single plane: defining the meanings and scopes of the
First Amendment and Commerce Clause or, in other words, determining whether an exercise of
the Commerce Clause power stands in conflict with any First Amendment rights.
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textualism-versus-intentionalism interpretive choice presented by
IDEA § 1415 in Arlington Central, a judge might recognize and even
discuss both interpretive methodologies, but he will contend that he
has no discretion to choose between the differing methodologies
because the law of interpretation ultimately favors one methodology
73
over the other.
In the second archetypal variant, judges will simply fail to
grapple with the competing injunctive interpretive principles. Instead,
judges will simply select an interpretive principle and apply it with
little or no explanation as to why certain competing interpretive
principles were subordinated. In the context of the textualism-versusintentionalism interpretive choice presented by IDEA § 1415, for
example, Justice Breyer simply applied intentionalism over
textualism, but he offered no discussion or explanation as to why
74
legislative intent should trump contrary statutory text.
Both avoidance maneuver variants are problematic because
(1) they misrepresent the law of interpretation and (2) they suppress
public discussion of decisive extralegal factors. Section A uses
Arlington Central and several lower federal court opinions dealing
with expert-witness fee shifting to illustrate the avoidance maneuver
in action. Section B examines what might motivate courts to resort to
the avoidance maneuver in cases of interpretive choice.
A. The Avoidance Maneuver in Arlington Central and Other IDEA
§ 1415 Cases
Thus far, this Article has used Arlington Central as the exemplar
case of interpretive choice. Numerous lower federal courts, however,
have issued opinions on expert-witness fee shifting under IDEA
75
§ 1415. The lower court opinions employed the two variants of the
avoidance maneuver. Some opinions expressly or implicitly suggested
76
that the law of interpretation favors text over intent, or vice versa.

73. See infra text accompanying notes 95–114.
74. See infra text accompanying notes 115–26.
75. Before the Supreme Court’s June 2006 decision in Arlington Central, forty-six cases
available in the Westlaw database considered whether prevailing parties may recover expertwitness fees under IDEA § 1415. The circuit courts had decided six cases on the issue, and the
district courts had decided forty, twenty-two of which were published in reporters and eighteen
of which were unpublished but available in the Westlaw database. For a list of these cases, see
infra Appendix.
76. Four of the six circuit court cases explicitly discussed whether statutory text or
legislative intent should prevail. See Goldring v. District of Columbia, 416 F.3d 70, 73–82 (D.C.
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Others simply mentioned either textualist themes or intentionalist
themes but failed to grapple with any conflicting interpretive
77
methods. Importantly, none of the opinions argued or suggested that
the law of interpretation could not resolve the choice between
statutory text and legislative intent. Nor did any of the opinions
suggest that legally unconstrained judicial discretion or extralegal
factors were central in deciding whether text or intent should control.
At one extreme of the first variant of the avoidance maneuver,
some of the opinions argued pointedly and explicitly that the law of
interpretation grants one interpretive principle a trump card over
another and that a legally superior statutory interpretation is
78
therefore obvious. For example, in Goldring v. District of Columbia,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
asserted that the law of interpretation does not permit any reference
to legislative history when statutory text is unambiguous. Citing a
frequently employed injunctive interpretive principle, the Goldring
majority declared that “there should be no resort to legislative history
79
when language is plain and does not lead to an absurd result.” The
court bolstered this declaration with a citation to a string of similar
80
supporting principles. Because the Goldring majority posited that
the law of interpretation favors statutory text over contrary legislative

Cir. 2005) (rejecting reliance on legislative history when interpreting IDEA § 1415); Murphy v.
Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 402 F.3d 332, 335–40 (2d Cir. 2005), vacated, 548 U.S.
291 (2006) (noting that although other courts had relied on the text of IDEA § 1415 alone, the
legislative history should be relevant to an interpretation of the statute); T.D. v. LaGrange Sch.
Dist. No. 102, 349 F.3d 469, 481–82 (7th Cir. 2003) (examining the legislative history of IDEA
§ 1415 but ultimately relying on the statutory text alone to reach a decision); Neosho R-V Sch.
Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022, 1032–33 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding that because the text of IDEA
§ 1415 is not ambiguous, there was no need to look to its legislative history). Two circuit court
cases did not discuss the text-versus-intent issue. In Arons v. New Jersey State Board of
Education, 842 F.2d 58 (3d Cir. 1988), the Third Circuit determined that fees charged by a lay
advocate are not recoverable, but the court noted in dicta and without analysis that fees for
anything qualifying as expert-witness work could be recovered. Id. at 62–63. Though Arons
offered no analysis of expert-witness fee shifting under IDEA § 1415, later courts cited Arons
for the proposition that the Third Circuit had interpreted the IDEA to permit expert-witness
fee shifting. E.g., Murphy, 402 F.3d at 334; P.G. v. Brick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 124 F. Supp. 2d 251,
267 (D.N.J. 2000). In Missouri Department of Elementary & Secondary Education v. Springfield
R-12 School District, 358 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 2004), the Eighth Circuit offered no analysis of the
text-versus-intent issue and merely cited circuit precedent establishing that expert-witness fees
are not recoverable. Id. at 1002.
77. See infra text accompanying notes 115–26.
78. Goldring v. District of Columbia, 416 F.3d 70 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
79. Id. at 75.
80. Id. at 74–75.
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intent, it concluded that the “correct decision” was “not . . . difficult
81
to reach.” As portrayed by the Goldring majority, the law of
interpretation grants clear statutory text a trump card over clear
contrary evidence of legislative intent. Therefore, per the court’s
logic, the court did not face an interpretive choice and did not
exercise legally unconstrained judicial discretion. The law of
interpretation pointed to a single legally superior construction of the
IDEA § 1415 fee-shifting provision, and any contrary construction
was legally inferior.
The dissenting opinion in Goldring also featured a pointed and
explicit treatment of the text-versus-intent dilemma. Somewhat
ironically, however, it argued that the law of interpretation holds that
even clear statutory text can be trumped by contrary legislative
82
intent. Like the majority opinion, the Goldring dissent explicitly
enunciated injunctive interpretive principles. The dissent cited the
Supreme Court for the injunctive interpretive principles that “the
ultimate purpose of statutory construction is to effectuate
83
congressional intent” and that “the strong presumption that the
plain language of the statute expresses congressional intent [can be]
84
rebutted . . . when a contrary legislative intent is clearly expressed.”
Like the Goldring majority opinion, the dissent offered supporting
citations to related injunctive interpretive principles, all of which
bolstered the notion that the law of interpretation favors clearly
85
expressed legislative intent over contrary statutory text. Thus, both
the majority and dissenting opinions in Goldring argued that the case
did not present an interpretive choice because the law of
interpretation decidedly favored one set of interpretive principles
over another and, therefore, decidedly favored one IDEA § 1415
interpretation over another.
86
The majority opinion in Neosho R-V School District v. Clark, a
case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, provides
87
another example of the first variant of the avoidance maneuver.
Like the Goldring majority opinion, the Neosho majority opinion
81. Id. at 73.
82. Id. at 80 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
83. Id.
84. Id. (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135–36
(1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
85. Id.
86. Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2003).
87. Id. at 1032–33.
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explicitly argued that the law of interpretation requires courts to
follow clear statutory text over contrary legislative intent. In the
words of the Eighth Circuit, “[T]he mere fact that statutory provisions
conflict with language in the legislative history is not an exceptional
circumstance permitting a court to apply the legislative history rather
88
than the statute.” The Neosho majority bolstered this interpretive
principle with citations to cases enunciating analogous injunctive
89
interpretive principles. Because the Neosho majority opinion cast
the law of interpretation as granting clear statutory text a trump over
clear, but contrary, legislative intent, it implicitly denied the presence
of any interpretive choice.
Other opinions exemplifying the first variant of the avoidance
maneuver were less explicit and pointed in citations to injunctive
interpretive principles. Still, these opinions strongly implied that
courts do not face interpretive choices or exercise legally unfettered
discretion because the law of interpretation grants a trump to either
unambiguous statutory text or conflicting unambiguous legislative
intent. The dissenting opinion in Neosho fits this model, as does the
90
Second Circuit’s decision in Murphy v. Arlington Central, the case
that was appealed to the Supreme Court in Arlington Central.
Unlike the dissent in Goldring, the Neosho dissent did not
explicitly cite injunctive interpretive principles prioritizing clear
legislative intent over clear statutory text. It would have been easy to
offer explicit citations. Eighth Circuit cases have long recognized the
principle that clear legislative intent may trump contrary statutory
91
text. Indeed, earlier in the same year that it decided Neosho, the

88. Id. at 1033 (quoting United States v. Erickson P’ship, 856 F.2d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir.
1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. Id. at 1032–33.
90. Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 402 F.3d 332 (2d Cir. 2005), vacated,
548 U.S. 291 (2006).
91. See, e.g., In re Waugh, 109 F.3d 489, 493 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the intent of
Congress must trump the literal meaning of the statutory text at issue and citing Ron Pair
Enterprises, Inc., for the proposition that “[t]he plain meaning of legislation should be
conclusive, except in the ‘rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a
result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters’” (alterations in original) (quoting
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989))); Mo. Dep’t of Revenue v. L.J.
O’Neill Shoe Co., 64 F.3d 1146, 1150 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing the same proposition from Ron Pair
Enterprises); Minnesota v. Hoffman, 543 F.2d 1198, 1202 (8th Cir. 1976) (“[A] statute will not be
read literally if such a reading leads to a result that conflicts with Congress’ intent.”);
Derengowski v. United States, 404 F.2d 778, 780 (8th Cir. 1968) (“The maxim of strict
construction may not be utilized to defeat the clear intent of a statute, nor to encompass within
its meaning something obviously omitted from its terms.”).
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Eighth Circuit explicitly recognized that a court may apply legislative
intent over contrary statutory text when “the literal application of a
statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions
92
of its drafters.” Though it omitted a citation to that particular case,
the Neosho dissent was built on this principle. The Neosho dissent
explained that “Congress’s clear legislative intent, [as well as] the
nature and purpose of the IDEA[,] compels an award of expert
93
witness fees as part of the costs.” In stressing that the superiority of
legislative intent and statutory purpose “compel[led]” a certain
interpretation of IDEA § 1415, the Neosho dissent implied that the
law of interpretation requires courts to apply clearly expressed
legislative intent over contrary statutory text.
The Second Circuit’s IDEA decision, Murphy v. Arlington
94
Central, in many ways paralleled the formula used by the Neosho
dissent. Like the Neosho dissent, the Murphy decision failed to cite
any cases for the proposition that clear intent should trump clear text.
It nonetheless strongly implied that these principles compelled or
required the court to favor intent over text. The closest the Murphy
court came to avowing an explicit injunctive interpretive rule was
with the following language: “While we appreciate—and in practice
honor, wherever possible—the virtues of relying solely on statutory
text, at times text without context can lead to results that Congress
95
did not intend.” This statement makes sense only if the Second
Circuit implicitly relied on an injunctive interpretive principle
granting clearly expressed legislative intent a trump over
unambiguous statutory text. Just as in the Neosho dissent, the court
had circuit precedent that it could have relied on for the principle that
clear intent will be determinative, even when it is contrary to the clear
96
text of a statute.

92. In re Kolich, 328 F.3d 406, 409 (8th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). In In re Kolich, 328
F.3d 406 (8th Cir. 2003), the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that other courts, in interpreting a
particular section of the Bankruptcy Code, had refused to “apply the [statutory-text] formula
literally” because literal application “would [have] produce[d] an outcome at odds with the
purpose of Congress.” Id. (citing Nelson v. Scala, 192 F.3d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1999)). Nevertheless,
the Eighth Circuit found that literal application of the statutory clause in question would not
conflict with legislative intent. Id. at 410.
93. Neosho R-V Sch. Dist., 315 F.3d at 1035 (Pratt, J., dissenting).
94. Murphy, 402 F.3d at 335–40.
95. Id. at 336.
96. Before the 2005 Murphy opinion, the Second Circuit had decided two cases in which it
endorsed an intent-over-text principle. See Tyler v. Douglas, 280 F.3d 116, 123 (2d Cir. 2001)
(“Although a statute’s plain language is generally dispositive, it sometimes will yield when
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Also paralleling the Neosho dissent was the Murphy court’s
97
argument that legislative intent, along with two other factors,
“require[d it] to find that Congress intended to and did authorize the
98
reimbursement of expert fees in IDEA actions.” A bit later in the
opinion, the Second Circuit reiterated that legislative intent required
the court to construe the IDEA as permitting recovery of expert99
witness fees. By stressing that the IDEA interpretation was
required, the Murphy decision strongly implied that the law of
interpretation privileges clear legislative intent over clear statutory
text, at least in the narrow circumstances presented by the case.
Neither the Murphy decision nor the Neosho dissent suggested that
judicial discretion or extralegal factors compelled an IDEA
interpretation privileging legislative intent over statutory text. To the
contrary, both implied that the law of interpretation compels and
requires a particular IDEA construction.
Like the various Goldring, Neosho, and Murphy opinions, the
Court’s majority and dissent in Arlington Central deployed the first
variant of the avoidance maneuver. Both the majority and dissenting
opinions in Arlington Central acknowledged that the law of
interpretation sanctions injunctive interpretive rules that could
support more than one IDEA interpretation. Ultimately, however,
both opinions argued or implied that the law of interpretation
identifies both a legally superior interpretive approach and a legally
superior interpretation of IDEA § 1415. In other words, both
evidence of legislative history is so strong to the contrary that giving a literal reading to the
statutory language will result in defeating Congress’ purpose in enacting it.” (quoting Greene v.
United States, 79 F.3d 1348, 1356 (2d Cir. 1996))); United States v. Arnold, 126 F.3d 82, 89 (2d
Cir. 1997) (“A statute should not be literally applied if it results in an interpretation clearly at
odds with the intent of the drafters.”). After the Murphy opinion, Second Circuit cases
continued to recognize the intent-over-text principle. See United States v. Whitley, 529 F.3d 150,
156 (2d Cir. 2008) (“We acknowledge that where the literal meaning of a statute yields an
illogical result or one manifestly not intended by the legislature, departure from strict adherence
to statutory text may be warranted.”); Goldman v. Cohen, 445 F.3d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 2006)
(“The plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the rare cases in which the
literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of
its drafters.” (quoting Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. at 242) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
97. First, the Murphy court believed that dicta in the Supreme Court case of West Virginia
University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991), was consistent with its analysis of IDEA
§ 1415’s legislative history. Murphy, 402 F.3d at 336–37. Second, the Murphy court believed that
congressional inaction following the Casey decision suggested that the Casey dicta had been
correct. Id. at 337.
98. Id. at 336.
99. Id. at 337.
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Arlington Central opinions ultimately argued that the law of
interpretation obviates any interpretive choice between textualism
and intentionalism, and that it thereby denies any meaningful role for
legally unconstrained judicial discretion.
In casting the law of interpretation as establishing that statutory
text trumps contrary legislative intent, the Arlington Central majority
invoked a variant of the familiar injunctive interpretive principle used
in the Goldring and Neosho majority opinions. The Arlington Central
majority stated that “[w]hen the statutory ‘language is plain, the sole
function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the
100
text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.’” The
majority opinion then outlined the reasons it found the text of the
101
IDEA to be unambiguous. For the majority, “the terms of the
IDEA overwhelmingly support[ed] the conclusion that prevailing
102
parents may not recover the costs of experts or consultants.”
The Arlington Central majority conceded that the legislative
record was contrary to its text-centered reading of the IDEA and
admitted that legislative history might deserve “merit in another
103
context.” Ultimately, however, the majority opinion concluded that
“where everything other than the legislative history overwhelmingly
suggests that expert fees may not be recovered, the legislative history
104
is simply not enough.” As the Arlington Central majority cast it, the
law of interpretation permits intentionalist interpretive methods and
consultation of legislative history in some circumstances. When
statutory text is unambiguous, however, the law of interpretation
grants statutory text a trump over evidence of contrary legislative
intent and, therefore, produces the IDEA interpretation advanced by

100. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006).
101. The majority found that the text of the IDEA provision on cost shifting—as well as
other statutory provisions that define “costs” and previous cases defining “costs” in other
contexts—supported this construction of the IDEA. Id. at 296–98, 300–03. In addition, the
majority argued that under the clear-statement rule of Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), because the IDEA was passed pursuant to Congress’s Spending
Clause power, the IDEA could not be read as providing states with clear notice that they would
have to pay prevailing parties’ expert-witness fees in IDEA cases. Arlington Cent., 548 U.S. at
295–96. In other words, the Pennhurst principle provides an additional reason to favor statutory
text over contrary legislative intent that might not be present in statutes that are not passed
pursuant to Congress’s Spending Clause powers.
102. Id. at 300.
103. Id. at 304.
104. Id.
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105

the majority. Thus, according to the Arlington Central majority, no
interpretive choice existed between text and intent: the law of
interpretation, not legally unconstrained judicial discretion, furnished
the grounds for saying that statutory text trumped contrary legislative
intent.
For its part, the Arlington Central dissent similarly cast the law of
interpretation—and not judicial discretion or extralegal factors—as
the arbiter between competing text- and intent-derived
interpretations of the IDEA. According to the dissent, however, the
law of interpretation favors legislative intent over statutory text. The
dissent offered an exhaustive recounting of the legislative history
establishing that Congress understood that the IDEA would permit
prevailing claimants to recover expert-witness fees as part of their
costs. The centerpiece of this evidence of legislative intent was the
House-Senate conference committee’s report on the IDEA. The
conference committee’s report stated that “[t]he conferees intend[ed]
that the term ‘attorneys’ fees as part of costs’ [would] include
106
reasonable expenses and fees of expert witnesses.” In addition, the
dissent described several other aspects of the record of legislative
history that demonstrated Congress’s understanding and intent
throughout the legislative process for prevailing claimants to recover
107
expert-witness fees as part of their costs. Ultimately, the dissent

105. The majority also held that when the Court is interpreting legislation passed pursuant
to the Spending Clause, it has additional reason to prefer clear text over contrary legislative
intent. Specifically, Justice Alito noted that the majority “[could ]not say that the legislative
history on which [the] respondents [were] rely[ing was] sufficient to provide the requisite fair
notice” of the cost to states. Id.
106. H.R. REP. NO. 99-687, at 5 (1986) (Conf. Rep.).
107. Arlington Cent., 548 U.S. at 309–13 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In essence, the dissent
argued that the record of legislative history suggested that the House, the Senate, and the
conference committee had all intended to permit the shifting of expert-witness fees, but that the
conference had adopted clumsy language that failed to express that intent unequivocally. On the
Senate side, a bipartisan compromise produced language that would have allowed courts to
award “a reasonable attorney’s fee in addition to the costs to a parent” who prevailed in an
IDEA action. S. REP. NO. 99-112, pt. 2, at 15 (1985). On the floor of the Senate, Senator Lowell
Weicker, Jr., explained that this language reflected the legislature’s “intent that such awards
[would] include, at the discretion of the court, reasonable attorney’s fees, [and] necessary expert
witness fees.” 131 CONG. REC. 21,390 (1985) (statement of Sen. Lowell Weicker, Jr.). The
Arlington Central dissent argued that “[t]he House version of the bill also reflected an intention
to authorize recovery of expert costs.” Arlington Cent., 548 U.S. at 310 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
The House Committee on Education and Labor reported a version of the bill that would have
permitted courts to “award reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses.” H.R. REP. NO. 99296, at 1, 5 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). The House report stated the following:
“The phrase ‘expenses and costs’ includes expenses of expert witnesses.” Id. at 6. The
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concluded, “Members of both Houses of Congress voted to adopt
both the statutory text [of the IDEA] and the Conference Report that
made clear that the statute’s words include[d] the expert costs here in
108
question.”
The dissent also addressed the text of the IDEA, admitting that
the majority’s interpretation represented the most “linguistically
109
natural” reading of the text. But the dissent argued that such an
110
understanding of the text was “not inevitable.” To the dissent, “the
word ‘costs’ alone, sa[id] nothing at all about which costs f[e]ll within
its scope” and the text of the IDEA did not “unambiguously foreclose
111
an award of expert fees.” Moreover, the dissent argued that “one
can, consistent with the language,” read the IDEA as permitting
112
recovery of expert-witness fees by prevailing IDEA claimants. In
short, the Arlington Central dissent did not base its IDEA
interpretation on the most natural meaning of the text, but instead on
a merely plausible textual construction that could be made
compatible with the contours of the unambiguously expressed
113
legislative intent.
In much the same style employed in the Neosho dissent and the
114
Murphy opinion, the Arlington Central dissent did not bother to
offer an explicit citation to cases enunciating injunctive interpretive
principles. Nonetheless, the structure of the argument in the
Arlington Central dissent plainly relied on a particular injunctive
interpretive principle. To simplify, the dissent (1) established clear
evidence of the legislature’s intent that expert-witness fees should be
conference committee reconciled the difference in the Senate and House versions of the costshifting provision by adopting an amendment providing that “the court, in its discretion, may
award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs.” H.R. REP. NO. 99-687, at 5 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The conference committee’s report explained that the conferees
intended for “the term ‘attorneys’ fees as part of the costs’ [to] include reasonable expenses and
fees of expert witnesses.” Id.
108. Arlington Cent., 548 U.S. at 313 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also bolstered
his evidence of legislative intent with the argument that adoption of the interpretation advanced
by the majority would undermine the basic purpose of the IDEA. Id. at 313–16.
109. Id. at 319.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Arguably, the dissent engaged in what Dean Roscoe Pound termed “spurious
interpretation.” See Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 379, 382 (1907)
(“[T]he object of spurious interpretation is to make, unmake, or remake, and not merely
discover [the meaning of statutory text].”).
114. See supra text accompanying notes 91–94.
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recoverable under IDEA § 1415; (2) argued that the text of IDEA
§ 1415 was susceptible to a construction permitting recovery of
expert-witness fees; and (3) concluded that the Court should adopt
the interpretation matching the clearly expressed legislative intent,
rather that the most linguistically natural interpretation. The dissent
did not pursue this structure to suggest that the Court is free to
engage in a legally unconstrained exercise of judicial discretion, giving
115
IDEA § 1415 whatever meaning it might prefer. To the contrary,
the dissent adopted this strategy because it implicitly relied on the
principle that courts should seek to interpret statutes in accordance
with the clear intent of Congress, as long as the statutory text is
susceptible to a meaning consistent with that clear intent. The
pedigree of this interpretive principle is well known and firmly
116
established.
The dissent’s choice of this interpretive principle is interesting.
The Arlington Central majority opinion, as well as the various
Goldring, Neosho, and Murphy opinions, all acknowledged that the
statutory text and the legislative intent stood in irreconcilable conflict.
They then argued or implied that the law of interpretation negated
any interpretive choice by granting unambiguous text a trump over
unambiguous intent, or vice versa. Justice Breyer’s Arlington Central
115. The dissent stated that it could “find no good reason . . . to interpret the language of
[the] statute as meaning the precise opposite of what Congress told us it intended.” Arlington
Cent., 548 U.S. at 309 (Breyer, J., dissenting). This statement suggests that the dissent
understood that the law of interpretation does not require courts to apply the most linguistically
natural reading of a statutory text over contrary legislative intent.
116. See United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 298 (1971) (“If an absolutely literal
reading of a statutory provision is irreconcilably at war with the clear congressional purpose, a
less literal construction must be considered.”); see also Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694,
706–07 & n.9 (2000) (adopting an interpretation that departed from the most natural or
ordinary meaning of the statutory text, in part because the ordinary meaning would have
contravened “clear congressional policy”); 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 125 (2001) (“In construing
a statute, the uncommon sense of a term may be relied on . . . when the realization of clear
congressional policy is in tension with the result that customary interpretive rules would deliver.
Where it is evident that some other meaning was intended, and the application of the commonly
accepted meaning would operate to defeat the purpose of the statute and the intent of the
legislature, a departure from the usual or natural meaning of the words in a statute may be
deemed proper. Indeed, it is an old and well-established maxim that words ought to be more
subservient to the intent, and not the intent to the words. Moreover, it is a general rule that the
manifest intent of the legislature will prevail over the literal import of the words.”); 2A
NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 46:7 (7th ed. 2007) (“Although many expressions favoring literal
interpretation may be found in caselaw, it is clear that if the literal import of the text of an act is
inconsistent with the legislative meaning or intent . . . the words of the statute will be construed
to agree with the intention of the legislature.”).
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dissent, in contrast, argued that the text and intent could be made
compatible, and that the law of interpretation requires courts to
adopt the reading most compatible with clearly expressed legislative
intent, even if that reading is at odds with the most natural textual
construction. Thus, the Arlington Central dissent relied on a narrower
principle than some of the lower court opinions that favored
legislative intent over contrary statutory text. Some of those opinions
went as far as to state or imply that clearly expressed legislative intent
117
trumps contrary statutory text. Justice Breyer’s Arlington Central
dissent argued only that clearly expressed legislative intent should
trump the most natural reading of statutory text—provided that the
text can be given a construction compatible with legislative intent. As
the Arlington Central dissent understood it, the law of interpretation
directs courts to bend statutory text to conform to clearly expressed
legislative intent, rather than to honor the most natural reading of
118
statutory text in the face of contrary legislative intent.
Though Justice Breyer’s approach was subtly different from that
119
of the lower courts, it had the same effect. As with the other
opinions, the Arlington Central dissent implied that the law of
interpretation dissolves any possible interpretive choice. The dissent’s
suggestion was not that the law of interpretation grants the Court
unfettered discretion to choose between text and contrary legislative
intent. Rather, the suggestion was more subtle: that the law of
interpretation favors clearly expressed legislative intent over the most
linguistically natural meaning of statutory text.
The majority and dissenting opinions in Arlington Central, as
well as the various Goldring, Neosho, and Murphy opinions,
demonstrate the first variant of the avoidance maneuver. Numerous
examples of the second variant of the avoidance maneuver can also

117. See supra text accompanying notes 76–79, 84–94.
118. In other words, as the dissent understood the law of interpretation, unambiguous
evidence of legislative intent trumps the most natural reading of a statutory text, at least when
the text will permit a meaning consistent with the legislative intent.
119. This approach strongly suggests that the dissent understood the law of interpretation in
a different fashion from the Arlington Central majority and the panels of circuit judges in
Goldring, Neosho, and Murphy. Those judges framed the central question as whether the law of
interpretation grants clear text a trump over clear legislative intent, or vice versa. The Arlington
Central dissent, by contrast, implied that it understood the law of interpretation as obligating
courts to ask a preliminary question: Can statutory text be made consistent with the clearly
expressed legislative intent? Only if the answer to this question were “no” would it become
necessary to decide whether the law of interpretation grants clear text a trump over clear and
irreconcilably conflicting legislative intent.
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be found among the lower federal court cases on the shifting of
expert-witness fees under the IDEA. These opinions did not grapple
with the issue of whether the law of interpretation favors text or
contrary legislative intent. Instead, they simply applied either
textualist or intentionalist principles with little or no analysis, and
they adopted the consequent IDEA § 1415 construction. As might be
expected, these cases were often found at the district court level,
where docket loads may not always permit expansive analysis in
120
written opinions.
121
For example, in Field v. Haddonfield Board of Education, the
U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey allowed recovery of
122
expert-witness fees under IDEA § 1415. The opinion merely cited
the conference committee’s report on the issue; it offered no
discussion of why that report should prevail over the text of IDEA
123
124
§ 1415. Similarly, in Aranow v. District of Columbia, the District
Court for the District of Columbia permitted recovery of expertwitness fees and stated nothing more than the following: “Based upon
a review of the legislative history of . . . 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e), the Court
is convinced that the award of fees for the services of an expert
witness is not barred under the Supreme Court’s analysis in West
125
Virginia [University] Hospitals, Inc. [v. Casey ] . . . and is consistent
126
with Congress’ purpose in enacting [§ 1415(e)].” The U.S. District
Court for the District of Connecticut was even more succinct in Mr. &
127
Mrs. B. v. Weston Board of Education. In that case, the Court cited
the conference committee’s report and a decision from another
federal district court and, without explanation, concluded that “the
120. Not all of the federal district court cases on expert-witness fee shifting under the IDEA
are characterized by superficial analysis. See, e.g., Brillon ex rel. Brillon v. Klein Indep. Sch.
Dist., 274 F. Supp. 2d 864, 870–72 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (discussing § 1415’s text, legislative history,
statutory purpose, and interpretation in other courts), rev’d in part, 100 Fed. App’x 309 (5th Cir.
2004); Pazik v. Gateway Reg’l Sch. Dist., 130 F. Supp. 2d 217, 220–21 (D. Mass. 2001) (analyzing
the text, legislative intent, and statutory purpose of § 1415 before discussing the Supreme
Court’s and First Circuit’s uses of legislative history).
121. Field v. Haddonfield Bd. of Educ., 769 F. Supp. 1313 (D.N.J. 1991).
122. Id. at 1323.
123. Id.
124. Aranow v. District of Columbia, 791 F. Supp. 318 (D.D.C. 1992).
125. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
126. Aranow, 791 F. Supp. at 318. This sparse treatment is particularly troubling because the
district court’s opinion reconsidered and altered its previous decision to deny recovery of
expert-witness fees in the same case based on the text of IDEA § 1415. Compare id., with
Aranow v. District of Columbia, 780 F. Supp. 46, 48 (D.D.C. 1992).
127. Mr. & Mrs. B. v. Weston Bd. of Educ., 34 F. Supp. 2d 777 (D. Conn. 1999).
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view that expert witness fees are recoverable under the IDEA as part
128
of attorney’s fees and costs [was] the better one.”
Cases offering little or no analysis of whether the law of
interpretation favors clear text or clear contrary legislative intent are
not limited to opinions permitting recovery of expert-witness fees
under IDEA § 1415. For example, in Hiram C. v. Manteca Unified
129
School District, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
California denied recovery of expert-witness fees and stated little
more than that “the IDEA has no provision for them” and that it was
“reluctant” to award them “without any clear authority from
130
131
Congress.” In Mayo v. Booker, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland was even more fleeting in denying recovery of
132
expert-witness fees under IDEA § 1415. The court merely stated
that, in its view, “expert witness fees [were] not recoverable under the
IDEA, which provides only for shifting of ‘reasonable attorneys’ fees
133
as part of the costs.’”
B. Why Deploy the Avoidance Maneuver?
Federal courts’ treatment of expert-witness fee shifting under
IDEA § 1415 illustrates the avoidance maneuver in the context of a
conflict between unambiguous statutory text and unambiguous
contrary legislative intent. Though the law of interpretation does not
include an ordering principle to resolve this conflict, none of the
federal courts interpreting IDEA § 1415 openly confronted this
reality. Instead, they deployed some variation of the avoidance
maneuver.
Why do courts deploy the avoidance maneuver? Why do they
deny the presence of interpretive choice? Why do they deny the roles
of legally unconstrained judicial discretion and extralegal factors in
resolving interpretive choices? Rule-of-law values prompt courts to
portray the law of interpretation as doing more work than it is
actually capable of doing in resolving interpretive choices. At bottom,
rule-of-law values maintain that established legal principles, rather

128. Id. at 784.
129. Hiram C. v. Manteca Unified Sch. Dist., No. S-03-2568 WBS KJM, 2004 WL 4999156
(E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2004).
130. Id. at *3–4.
131. Mayo v. Booker, 56 F. Supp. 2d 597 (D. Md. 1999).
132. See id. at 599.
133. Id.
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than legally unconstrained discretion, should govern. Applied to
courts, rule-of-law values dictate that judges should both arrive at and
justify their decisions through legal norms, not by reference to
extralegal factors such as policy considerations or personal
135
preferences. Applied to cases presenting interpretive choices, rule134. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“The government of the
United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men.”);
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72 (1944) (defining the rule of law as requiring
“that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand—rules
which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive
powers in given circumstances”); POSNER, supra note 34, at 89 (“[O]ne meaning of the term
‘rule of law’ . . . . is ‘a government of laws not men’—that is, that law is the ruler of the nation
rather than officials being the rulers.”).
135. Extralegal policy considerations and the personal preferences of judges probably do
affect judicial decisionmaking. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 34, at 9, 81 (acknowledging that
extralegal factors such as judges’ “own political opinions or policy judgments” play a role in
judicial decisionmaking and referring to judges as “occasional legislators”); RICHARD A.
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 123–26 (1995) (analyzing how judicial behavior can be affected by
extralegal factors and personal preferences); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 86–96 (2002) (discussing the
attitudinal model, which posits that the political ideologies of judges may drive their judicial
decisions); James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest
for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6, 94 (2005) (concluding that canons of construction
“are regularly used in an instrumental if not ideologically conscious manner” and that the use of
canons “is fundamentally a façade to justify certain judicially devised policy preferences”);
Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate
Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 265–79 (1997) (discussing the attitudinal
model, which “suggests that judicial decisionmaking is not based upon reasoned judgment from
precedent, but rather upon each judge’s political ideology and the identity of the parties”);
Bryan D. Lammon, What We Talk About When We Talk About Ideology: Judicial Politics
Scholarship and Naive Legal Realism, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 231, 244–45 (2009) (discussing the
attitudinal model, which “posits that judges decide cases based on their political attitudes and
values”).
As a justification for judicial decisions, however, extralegal factors are almost never
considered sufficient. Courts are expected to offer justifications for their decisions that are
rooted in the application of legal principles, rather than extralegal factors. See Robert J.
Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand Theories: A Neo-Realist View of
Statutory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 33 (1993) (“The purpose of the opinion is,
rather, to show that the decision is not arbitrary but can be supported rationally and is not
inconsistent with prior decisions of the court or, in the case of a statute, with the text of the
statute.”); Thomas W. Merrill, A Modest Proposal for a Political Court, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 137, 137 (1994) (“The legitimacy of the Supreme Court is widely assumed to depend on
the perception that its decisions are dictated by law.”); Martin Shapiro, Judges as Liars, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 155, 155–56 (1994) (“Presumably, courts could tell the loser: ‘You
have lost because we, the judges, have chosen that you should lose. We have so chosen because
we think society would be better off if you lost.’ Courts have decided, however, in all of the
societies that have a modern judicial system, to avoid the appearance of deciding cases based on
judicial whim. . . . [I]n all modern societies, and in all cases, judges tell the loser: ‘You did not
lose because we the judges chose that you should lose. You lost because the law required that
you should lose.’”).
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of-law values admonish courts against contending that extralegal
considerations determine which interpretive principles, and which
136
interpretations, will prevail. To the contrary, rule-of-law values
demand that courts cast their chosen interpretive principles and
consequent statutory interpretations as compelled by the law of
137
interpretation. A legal opinion that is consistent with rule-of-law
values seeks to explain why the law of interpretation requires certain
injunctive interpretive principles to control and why it generates one
legally superior statutory construction.
Courts have strong instrumental reasons to adhere to rule-of-law
values. All other things being equal, a judicial opinion adhering to
rule-of-law values protects the legitimacy of courts and judicial
138
decisionmaking. An opinion contrary to rule-of-law values, by
contrast, erodes the legitimacy of courts and judicial
139
decisionmaking. The rule of law has its limits, though. No active
participant in the legal system or observant legal scholar would
contend that extant legal principles fully determine the outcome of
every case. To one degree or another, judicial discretion and
136. See Lawrence C. Marshall, The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial
Constraints: A Response to Macey and Miller, 45 VAND. L. REV. 673, 685 (1992) (“In the case of
statutory interpretation, the ‘duty to the rules of law’ is generally recognized to carry with it the
obligation for the judge to do her best to interpret what Congress has said before she moves on
to decide a case explicitly on her own policy preferences. . . . Whether or not a judge personally
accepts this view of her role, the dominant legal culture that restrains and evaluates judges
forces judges to adhere to it, at least in form.”).
137. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal
Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 838–39 (1991) (“In our law, however, the exercise of a
power to speak authoritatively as an interpreter carries with it an obligation to explain the
grounds upon which the interpreter gives that authoritative judgment. If we begin with the
notion that giving such reasons will occur to us only in circumstances in which different
approaches produce different results, the argument moves back a step. We, or the authoritative
interpreter, must be able to state why some particular approach to reason-giving is a legitimate
way to give authoritative meaning to the words of the text.”).
138. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Some Tasks in Understanding Law Through the Lens of
Public Choice, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 284, 287 (1992) (“Judges, more than other political
actors, must answer the question of why anyone should obey. The president has the army,
Congress the purse. Judges have reason. . . . The rule of law attracts formidable support only so
long as people believe that there is a rule of law and not a rule by judges. . . . [I]t is most unlikely
that obedience will long be forthcoming to an institution that appears to be simply
subcommittee chairmen wearing robes.”).
139. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical
Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1120 (1992) (“As in constitutional interpretation, scholars in the
statutory field are confronted with the so-called countermajoritarian difficulty—the problem of
life-tenured, unelected judges making policy decisions. If all or most statutory cases turn on
policy factors left to the judge’s choice, how can that exercise of power be considered
legitimate?”).
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extralegal factors affect both judicial decisionmaking and case
140
outcomes. Regardless of which factors actually drive an outcome, a
desire to adhere to rule-of-law values encourages judges to offer
justifications in their legal opinions that sidestep extralegal factors
and to portray their legal opinions as driven by the law of
141
interpretation. Rule-of-law values, in other words, prompt courts to
justify and explain their decisions as grounded in and following from
142
extant legal principles. Courts seek to ground their opinions in ruleof-law values even when the law alone cannot fully decide the case.
Thus, courts often oversell the ability of the law of interpretation to
determine outcomes. This observation holds true even in those
situations in which an exercise of legally unconstrained judicial
discretion might be thought unavoidable.
Consider a situation—unlike that in Arlington Central—in which
143
the underlying statutory materials were truly ambiguous. When
statutory materials are ambiguous, by definition, they are subject to
more than one legally justifiable and plausible interpretation. As
such, the power of the law to determine outcomes in cases of genuine
ambiguity is very limited. In explaining their decisions in these kinds
of cases, courts typically accentuate the role played by the law of
interpretation, while obscuring or omitting the role played by judicial
144
discretion and extralegal factors. In Smith v. United States, for
example, the Supreme Court was required to interpret a federal
140. See Ward Farnsworth, Signature of Ideology: The Case of the Supreme Court’s Criminal
Docket, 104 MICH. L. REV. 67, 51 (2005) (“Everyone suspects that Supreme Court justices’ own
views of policy play a part in their decisions, but the size and nature of the part is a matter of
vague impression and frequent dispute.”).
141. See POSNER, supra note 34, at 41 (stating that “[l]egalism . . . hypothesizes that judicial
decisions are determined by ‘the law,’” that “the legalist theory of judging . . . remains the
judiciary’s ‘official’ theory of judicial behavior,” that the Supreme Court claims adherence to
legalism because it is “a political court . . . especially in need of protective coloration,” and that
“the legalist slogan is ‘the rule of law’”); JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND
POLITICAL TRIALS, at x (1986) (“[T]he quest for the holy grail of perfect, nonpolitical, aloof
neutral law and legal decisions . . . remains a test for acceptability.”).
142. Presumably, not only the justifications for judicial decisions, but also judicial decisions
themselves, should be driven by legal norms. Cf. Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA.
L. REV. 987, 991 (2008) (offering a nonconsequentialist argument in support of the courts’
obligation to “not only justify their decisions, [but also] make the reasons for their decisions
publicly available”).
143. In this kind of case, courts do not necessarily face interpretive choice. Rather than
choosing among competing injunctive interpretive principles, courts apply the same or similar
interpretive principles but nonetheless grapple with conflicting, plausible constructions of a
given statute.
144. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
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statute that imposed a minimum prison sentence for any defendant
who, “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug
145
trafficking crime[,] uses . . . a firearm.” By a 6–3 vote, the Court held
that the word “uses” in the statute encompasses not only discharging
or brandishing a firearm, but also bartering drugs in exchange for a
146
147
firearm. Though the statutory text was ambiguous and the
148
149
evidence of legislative intent was both sparse and inconclusive,
both the majority and the dissent in Smith framed their chosen
interpretations as deriving from the law of interpretation. The
majority adopted a broad interpretation and cast its chosen
interpretation as following from application of the ordinary-meaning
150
151
principle and the whole-act rule. The dissent advocated a narrow

145. Id. at 227 (alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2006)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
146. Id. at 241.
147. The 6–3 split at the Supreme Court level and the split among the circuit courts attest to
the ambiguity of the language. See id. at 227 (discussing the circuit split). Nonetheless, and
somewhat incredibly, both the Supreme Court majority and dissenting opinions maintained that
the statutory text was clear and not ambiguous. See id. at 239–40 (arguing that the rule of lenity
should not apply because the statute was not ambiguous); id. at 246–47 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the statutory text was not ambiguous but that if it were, the rule of lenity should
apply).
148. United States v. Phelps, 877 F.2d 28, 30 (9th Cir. 1989) (acknowledging that “the
legislative history of § 924 is ‘sparse’” (quoting United States v. Moore, 580 F.2d 360, 362 (9th
Cir. 1978))).
149. The Supreme Court majority thought its expansive interpretation of the phrase was
consistent with legislative intent and statutory purpose. See Smith, 508 U.S. at 240 (“Imposing a
more restrictive reading of the phrase ‘uses . . . a firearm’ does violence not only to the structure
and language of the statute, but to its purpose as well. . . . We therefore see no reason why
Congress would have intended courts and juries applying § 924(c)(1) to draw a fine
metaphysical distinction between a gun’s role in a drug offense as a weapon and its role as an
item of barter . . . .” (first omission in original)). The Ninth Circuit, however, understood that
Congress intended the statutory phrase to be limited to the use of a gun “as an offensive
weapon” and not as an item of barter. See Phelps, 877 F.2d at 30 (discussing statutory purpose
and legislative intent before concluding “that the mere presence of a firearm does not trigger
the statute” because “Congress directed the statute at ‘persons who chose to carry a firearm as
an offensive weapon for a specific criminal act’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 314 n.10 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3492)).
150. See Smith, 508 U.S. at 228 (citing the ordinary-meaning principle, which dictates that
“[w]hen a word is not defined by statute, [the court should] normally construe it in accord with
its ordinary or natural meaning”).
151. See id. at 233 (citing the whole-act principle, which provides that “[a] provision that
may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme
because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning clear, or
because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible
with the rest of the law” (quoting United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Assocs., 484 U.S. 365,
371 (1988)) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
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interpretation and cast its interpretation as following—ironically—
152
from the ordinary-meaning principle and from whole-act analysis.
Because both the majority and the dissenting opinions in Smith
offered plausible readings of the word “used” in the sentencing
statute, their respective interpretations were both, in a limited way,
derived from the application of injunctive interpretive principles.
Indeed, both opinions emphasized how their chosen interpretations
followed from application of the ordinary-meaning and whole-actrule interpretive principles. Thus, the opinions adhered to rule-of-law
values by offering the appearance that the outcomes were required by
153
extant legal principles.
Importantly, however, neither opinion in Smith confronted or
discussed the pivotal question: What factors referee between two
plausible but divergent understandings of ordinary meaning? Nothing
in the law of interpretation can locate a single ordinary meaning for
the word “uses” in the sentencing statute. In Smith, the underlying
statutory text was fraught with irreducible ambiguity. Indeed, Smith
seemed to be a case in which the precise outer contours of the word
“uses”—specifically, as to whether that word included or excluded
bartering drugs for a gun—took no discernible shape until after the
Court had interpreted the statute.
To select between two plausible understandings of the word
“uses,” a court necessarily must exercise legally unconstrained
judicial discretion and must resort to considerations outside the law of
interpretation. Yet neither the majority opinion nor the dissenting
opinion in Smith acknowledged the role of judicial discretion or
discussed the decisive extralegal factors. To the contrary, both
opinions cast their favored interpretations as derived from the
application of injunctive interpretive principles. Both opinions, in
other words, portrayed the law of interpretation as doing more work
in determining the meaning of the statute than it possibly could have
done, and also portrayed judicial discretion and extralegal
considerations as lesser ingredients than they necessarily must have
been.

152. See id. at 242, 245–46 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (using the ordinary-meaning principle to
explain that “[i]n the search for statutory meaning, [the Court will] give nontechnical words and
phrases their ordinary meaning” and later employing whole-act analysis to emphasize the
difference between “using” and “carrying” a firearm).
153. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 135, at 155–56 (arguing that a court must deny that it makes law
and must instead assert dishonestly that legal norms determine outcomes).
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The same phenomenon appears in cases of interpretive choice
such as Arlington Central. In these cases, the law of interpretation is
not called upon to clarify ambiguous statutory materials. Rather, the
underlying statutory materials—statutory text and evidence of
legislative intent—are individually unambiguous but collectively
inconsistent. Nonetheless, because the law of interpretation lacks
ordering principles, courts necessarily must exercise legally
unconstrained judicial discretion to select between conflicting
injunctive interpretive principles. Yet, as seen in the cases applying
IDEA § 1415, the pull of rule-of-law values encourages courts to
portray the law of interpretation, rather than judicial discretion and
extralegal factors, as the key element driving the selection. By casting
the law of interpretation as definitively favoring statutory text over
legislative intent, or vice versa, courts portray the outcome as driven
by extant legal principles. The avoidance maneuver, in short, enables
the reasoning in judicial opinions to adhere to rule-of-law values and,
in turn, seeks to enhance or at least to preserve the legitimacy of
154
judicial decisionmaking.
The avoidance maneuver, however, comes at a price. Though the
avoidance maneuver may enable judicial opinions to adhere to ruleof-law values and to preserve the legitimacy of judicial action, courts
deploying it portray the law of interpretation as though it includes
ordering principles that establish hierarchies of injunctive interpretive
norms. This misrepresents the law of interpretation. Moreover,
because courts portray the law of interpretation as determinative
when they deploy the avoidance maneuver, they fail to offer a public
discussion of the extralegal considerations that are in fact crucial to
the ultimate outcome.
Despite these problems, courts almost universally respond to
interpretive choice with the avoidance maneuver. Legal opinions that
openly acknowledge that the law of interpretation fails to favor
certain injunctive interpretive principles over others are rare, if they
exist at all. None of the opinions interpreting the expert-witness feeshifting provision of the IDEA declared that the law of interpretation
is indifferent between textualist or intentionalist principles. None of

154. See Zeppos, supra note 139, at 1122 (“In statutory cases, judges are regularly
confronted with the need to make value or policy choices. . . . Citation to authority provides a
basis for the judge’s choice other than her own personal preferences. The use of authority allows
the judge to express a value choice while claiming that the policy preference finds support in a
recognized legal authority.”).
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the opinions declared that the court faced a legally unconstrained
choice between conflicting interpretive principles and incompatible
interpretations of IDEA § 1415. None of the opinions declared that
the court had to go outside the law of interpretation to arrive at its
155
outcome. Instead, every opinion deployed the avoidance maneuver.
III. TRANSPARENT JUSTIFICATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE
AVOIDANCE MANEUVER
Courts have another option. Rather than deploying some
variation of the avoidance maneuver, judges could respond to
interpretive choice by writing opinions characterized by transparent
justification. Transparent justification would entail acknowledging
that the law of interpretation generates an interpretive choice and
then openly explaining the extralegal factors that led the court to
choose one legally valid interpretation over another interpretation of
equal legal validity. In the context of the IDEA § 1415 fee-shifting
provision, transparent justification would mean an opinion that (1)
openly acknowledged that when unambiguous statutory text and
unambiguous legislative intent clash, the law of interpretation favors
neither textualist nor intentionalist principles; (2) openly
acknowledged that the law of interpretation sanctions two opposing
IDEA § 1415 interpretations of equal legal validity; and (3) offered a
frank and full explanation of the extralegal factors that persuaded the
Court to favor one legally valid interpretation over a different
interpretation of equal legal validity.
Unlike the avoidance maneuver, transparent justification does
not involve any misrepresentation of the law of interpretation. It
instead obliges courts to offer a public explanation of the factors
beyond the law of interpretation that help determine outcomes. In
other words, the avoidance maneuver’s liabilities are transparent
justification’s assets.
Conversely, although transparent justification eliminates the
more problematic aspects of the avoidance maneuver, it also
eliminates the avoidance maneuver’s main putative virtue: adherence
to rule-of-law values. Admittedly, transparent justification represents
the antithesis of rule-of-law values. Rather than seeking to explain
how a judicial interpretation of a statute follows from a neutral
application of the law of interpretation, it does the opposite. It seeks

155. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 75–99.
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to explain why a judicial interpretation cannot follow from
application of the law of interpretation alone. It concedes the role of
legally unconstrained judicial discretion and judicial reliance on
factors outside the law of interpretation.
The overwhelming dominance of the avoidance maneuver in
cases of interpretive choice suggests that courts estimate that
transparent justification would be so inimical to rule-of-law values
that its costs—potential damage to the legitimacy of judicial
decisionmaking—would outweigh any possible benefits. At a
minimum, judges must perceive the cost-benefit ratio of the
avoidance maneuver to be more favorable than the cost-benefit ratio
of transparent justification.
This reasoning is fundamentally flawed. Ultimately, the case in
favor of the avoidance maneuver is weaker than it might first appear,
and the case in favor of transparent justification is stronger than most
might believe. I do not argue, however, that reasonable minds must
unanimously resolve that courts should jettison the avoidance
maneuver in favor of transparent justification. The appeal of apparent
adherence to rule-of-law values is not trivial, and, therefore, the case
in favor of the avoidance maneuver is not wholly devoid of value.
Moreover, transparent justification is unconventional, and courts
might therefore approach it with trepidation. Accordingly, I argue
only that the case in favor of the avoidance maneuver is weak
enough, and the case in favor of transparent justification is strong
enough, that reasonable minds could, at the very least, disagree over
which option represents the better judicial response to interpretive
choice.
Courts, however, have universally rejected transparent
justification and have embraced the avoidance maneuver. The judicial
response to interpretive choice should not be so one-sided. The
merits and demerits of the two alternatives are close enough that
courts should give more serious consideration to transparent
justification, and at least some courts should conclude that
156
transparent justification is the better alternative.

156. Only a few judges openly acknowledge the limits of legal norms and the role of
extralegal policy factors in their decisionmaking. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 135, at 123–26
(suggesting that judges’ self-interest may shape judicial practices); Barak, supra note 34, at 33–
36 (noting that society’s perception of the judicial role influences judicial activity).
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A. Why Transparent Justification Does Not Undermine Rule-of-Law
Values
I begin with the source of the supposed weakness of transparent
justification and the supposed strength of the avoidance maneuver:
adherence—or the lack thereof—to rule-of-law values. If courts were
to deploy transparent justification in cases of interpretive choice, they
would offer opinions antithetical to rule-of-law values and thus
adverse to the legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking. Or so critics
157
would argue. It is true that transparent justification does not strive
toward adherence to rule-of-law values. By acknowledging that the
law of interpretation does not resolve interpretive choices, courts
would be candidly declaring that cases’ outcomes are determined not
by law, but instead by legally unconstrained judicial discretion and
extralegal factors.
Imagine, for example, how Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in
Arlington Central might have read if it had deployed transparent
justification. The Arlington Central dissent relied heavily on the
principle that the law of interpretation favors clearly expressed
legislative intent over the most linguistically natural reading of
158
statutory text. Had the dissent deployed transparent justification, it
would have done several things: First, it would have noted that the
law of interpretation encompasses two equally valid but contradictory
principles—one that favors legislative intent over statutory text, and
one that favors the ordinary meaning of the text over contrary
evidence of legislative intent. Second, the dissent would have
conceded that nothing in the law of interpretation determines which
of these adverse injunctive interpretive principles is legally superior
and, therefore, that the Court had to look outside the law of
interpretation to make its own determination. Third, the dissent
would have enumerated and discussed the factors outside the law of
interpretation that led the Court to favor one injunctive interpretive
principle over another.
None of this analysis would have adhered to the rule-of-law
prescription that judges should decide cases in accordance with extant

157. Courts are expected to offer justifications for their decisions that are rooted in the
application of legal principles rather than extralegal factors. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, How an
Instrumental View of Law Corrodes the Rule of Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 469, 490 (noting that
“the official line of the legal culture is still that judges are rule-bound in their decisions”); supra
note 135.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 101–14.
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legal norms and should avoid resorting to extralegal considerations.
Courts are in closest adherence to rule-of-law values when they base
their decisions on preexisting legal norms rather than on extralegal
159
In other words, from a rule-of-law perspective, the
factors.
legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking stands on the most secure
footing when courts can credibly claim that the application of
preexisting, unambiguous legal norms leads to a single, unequivocal
outcome. In these situations, courts can credibly claim that the law—
and not extralegal factors, such as policy considerations or the
personal preferences of the judge or judges—determined the case’s
outcome. By responding to interpretive choice with transparent
justification, though, the dissenting opinion in Arlington Central
would have entertained no pretense that the law had been
determinative or that judicial discretion and factors outside the law of
interpretation had been immaterial.
Herein lies the supposed problem with transparent justification:
any legal opinion deploying transparent justification acknowledges a
situation diametrically opposed to the situation most in adherence to
rule-of-law values and most protective of the legitimacy of judicial
decisionmaking. At bottom, however, this problem is inherent not so
much in the technique of transparent justification but rather in
interpretive choice itself. True, a court responding to an interpretive
choice with transparent justification could not credibly claim that the
law of interpretation pointed to a singular legally superior outcome or
that factors outside of the law of interpretation were not
determinative. And true, a court using transparent justification could
not expect any legitimacy-preserving effect via supposed adherence to
rule-of-law values.
But transparent justification is not itself the real reason behind
these truths—the law of interpretation is. Because the law of
interpretation contains no ordering principles, it cannot referee
conflicts between competing injunctive interpretive principles. A
court necessarily must rely on extralegal factors and necessarily will
exercise legally unconstrained discretion when selecting between
competing injunctive interpretive principles and consequent
competing interpretations. Nothing in the way that judges choose to
explain or justify the selection they make can change this reality.
Whether a court decides to admit this fact openly—as in transparent

159. See supra note 135.
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justification—or to obscure it—through the avoidance maneuver—is
irrelevant and beside the point.
Stated differently, the problem of a lack of adherence to rule-oflaw values and the corresponding debasement of the legitimacy of
judicial decisionmaking do not stem from the use of transparent
justification. Instead, they are part and parcel of the phenomenon of
interpretive choice. Cases presenting an interpretive choice belong
inescapably to the class of cases in which legally unconstrained
judicial discretion and extralegal considerations, rather than extant
legal norms, will be the ultimate determinants. Courts deploying the
160
avoidance maneuver may simulate adherence to rule-of-law values.
In reality, however, in cases of interpretive choice, adherence to ruleof-law values is not fully possible. In cases of interpretive choice, the
law of interpretation can do no more than narrow the field of choice
to opposing interpretations of equal legal validity. Legally
unconstrained judicial discretion and extralegal factors will ultimately
select between these opposing interpretations.
B. Why the Avoidance Maneuver Does Not Enhance Rule-of-Law
Values
The avoidance maneuver cannot alter the brute fact that, in cases
of interpretive choice, the law of interpretation is not the deciding
factor. At best, all the avoidance maneuver can do is drape judicial
discretion in a rule-of-law façade. The supposed benefit of the
avoidance maneuver, therefore, is no benefit at all. Or it would be a
benefit only if its obfuscatory gambit deceived relevant audiences into
believing that the law of interpretation determines outcomes. But the
avoidance maneuver almost always fails to deceive relevant
audiences.
The audiences closest to a legal dispute—lawyers and litigants—
will not be deceived easily. In a case such as Arlington Central, the
notion that the lawyers and litigants might be duped into accepting
that the law of interpretation decidedly and uncontroversially favors
clear statutory text over clear contrary legislative intent approaches
the absurd. The lawyers in Arlington Central were fully aware that the
law of interpretation does not definitively establish whether textualist

160. See Zeppos, supra note 139, at 1121 (“Judges might perform [a] legitimating function
by lying or deception—that is, by acting as if originalist or textual sources alone compel a result
and not revealing the real grounds for decision.”).
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or intentionalist injunctive principles should prevail. If nothing else,
the attorneys would have noted that the various IDEA § 1415 cases in
the lower courts had vacillated in reliance on diametrically opposed
162
injunctive interpretive principles. As such, they would understand
that the inclinations and dispositions of five Supreme Court Justices,
rather than the law of interpretation, would determine whether text
or contrary legislative intent would prevail. A mere judicial assertion
that the law of interpretation demands that statutory text trump
contrary legislative intent could not have persuaded the litigating
attorneys to believe that judicial discretion and extralegal factors
163
were immaterial. Indeed, if judges could deceive lawyers merely by
proclaiming that the law of interpretation unequivocally requires that
clear text trump contrary clear legislative intent, one should be
worried not about the legitimacy of courts, but rather about the
judicial system as a whole. Any legal system populated by attorneys
unable to pierce such a transparent distortion of the law would fall
into terminal dysfunction.
In a way, courts that deploy the avoidance maneuver are
audacious to the point of imprudence. Opinions deploying the
avoidance maneuver confidently maintain that the law of
interpretation contemplates certain hierarchies of injunctive
interpretive principles. But they make this claim in the face of
dissenting opinions, previous opinions from the same court, and
previous opinions from other courts that claim just as confidently that
the law of interpretation contemplates the exact opposite hierarchy of
161. The litigants’ Supreme Court briefs included extensive discussions of the conflicting
injunctive interpretive principles. See Brief of Petitioner at 21–24, Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd.
of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006) (No. 05-18) (arguing that the statutory language is
unambiguous and that the Second Circuit therefore erred in relying on legislative history to
construe the IDEA); Brief of Respondent at 16–17, 30, Arlington Cent., 548 U.S. 291 (No. 0518) (asserting that the legislative history, the plain meaning of the statutory text, and sources
contemporary to the statute indicated that the IDEA authorized the respondents to recover the
cost of their expert’s participation); Brief for the National Disability Rights Network and the
Center for Law and Education as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 17, 28, Arlington
Cent., 548 U.S. 291 (No. 05-18) (arguing that the provision must be read in the context of the
rest of the IDEA and its legislative history).
162. See supra note 77.
163. The simple fact that five Supreme Court Justices joined an opinion claiming that the
law of interpretation grants statutory text a trump over legislative intent, whereas three Justices
joined a dissent maintaining the exact opposite, undermines any argument in support of the
avoidance maneuver’s ability to deceive. A judicial assertion that the law of interpretation
demands X, countered by a judicial assertion that the law of interpretation demands not-X, only
reinforces the reality that the law of interpretation fails to resolve whether X or not-X should
prevail.
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injunctive interpretive principles. Plausible arguments might
reasonably contend that unvarnished and all-inclusive candor is not
164
always the best policy for courts. Perhaps a judicial white lie is a
necessary expedient in some situations. A judicial white lie, however,
is inadvisable when it is obviously and demonstrably erroneous. Or, at
least, the obviously erroneous judicial white lie should be the rare
exception rather than the universal rule of judicial justification. If the
avoidance maneuver convinced lawyers and their clients that the law
of interpretation decides cases involving interpretive choices, then it
might produce some salutary effect in terms of preserving the
legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking. In the end, however, the
avoidance maneuver’s feigned adherence to rule-of-law values is too
165
easily detected.
Any supposed legitimacy-enhancing effect is
therefore nugatory and probably even counterproductive.
If the avoidance maneuver does not deceive litigants and their
lawyers, what about the broader relevant audience? Might the
avoidance maneuver’s illusion of adherence to rule-of-law values
preserve the legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking in the eyes of the
general public? Though lawyers understand the basic features of the
law of interpretation, the general public is, understandably, less aware
of judicial decisions as a whole. Thus, perhaps the avoidance
maneuver might deceive the general public into believing that the law
of interpretation resolves cases involving interpretive choices or,
more generally, that the law, rather than legally unconstrained
judicial discretion, determines outcomes. If this were the case, then
the avoidance maneuver arguably might represent an imperfect but
defensible expedient for courts facing interpretive choices.
In the end, however, the avoidance maneuver has no salutary
effect on the general public for the exact opposite reason that it has
no effect on attorneys. The avoidance maneuver does not deceive
attorneys because they know too much. They can research conflicting

164. See Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307,
1310 (1995) (arguing in favor of weighing the prudential value of candor against competing
values); Schwartzman, supra note 142, at 988–99 (cataloguing the arguments against judicial
candor); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353,
358–59 (1989) (arguing that judicial candor in statutory-interpretation cases would undermine
the legitimacy of courts).
165. See Francis J. Mootz, III, Rethinking the Rule of Law: A Demonstration That the
Obvious Is Plausible, 61 TENN. L. REV. 69, 71 (1993) (“No lawyer really believes that judges and
administrators can apply rules derived from neutral premises without implicating their own
values and perspectives.”).

GONZALEZ IN PRINTER PROOF

634

11/12/2011 3:36:36 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:583

injunctive interpretive principles and see that the law of
interpretation lacks ordering principles that definitively resolve
interpretive choices. The general public, by contrast, knows too little.
The general public maintains only a vague awareness and
understanding of judicial institutions and does not fully understand
166
Opting for transparent
the intricacies of judicial opinions.
justification instead of the avoidance maneuver in cases of
interpretive choice would cause nary a ripple in the sensibilities of the
167
general public. Courts strive to offer opinions that adhere to rule-oflaw values, depict legal norms as determinative, and minimize or
obscure the roles of legally unconstrained judicial discretion and
extralegal factors. Yet if anything, the general public already
comprehends that judges often exercise legally unconstrained
168
discretion. Evidently, the general public is either unaware of or

166. See Kathleen Hall Jamieson & Michael Hennessy, Public Understanding of and
Support for the Courts: Survey Results, 95 GEO. L.J. 899, 899 (2007) (finding that “public
knowledge about . . . the courts is low”); Herbert M. Kritzer, The Impact of Bush v. Gore on
Public Perceptions and Knowledge of the Supreme Court, 85 JUDICATURE 32, 34 (2001) (“Most
research on the public’s knowledge of the Supreme Court concludes that the public knows little
about the Court or its workings. A regularly cited example of the public’s ignorance is that in
1989, 71 percent could not name a single member of the Court while 54 percent of the same
sample could name the judge on the television show ‘The People’s Court.’ That this survey
found such results was not news to political scientists, who have long documented the minimal
knowledge most citizens have about the Court.”); see also Gregory A. Caldeira, Court and
Public Opinion, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 303, 303 (John B. Gates
& Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991) (stating that Supreme Court decisions “lack . . . saliency in all
but a few situations”); Ilya Somin & Sanford Levinson, Debate, Democracy, Political Ignorance,
and Constitutional Reform, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 239, 247–48 (2009), http://
www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/ConstitutionalReform.pdf (“Former Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor has recently complained that ‘[t]wo-thirds of Americans know at least one of the
judges on the Fox TV show American Idol, but less than one in ten can name the Chief Justice
of the United States Supreme Court.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Justice O’Connor)).
167. Not even Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), which was viewed by many commentators
as driven by politics rather than law, and which was surely among the most widely reported
Supreme Court cases of all time, meaningfully altered public perception of the Supreme Court.
See Kritzer supra note 166, at 36 (finding that Bush v. Gore had only a modest short-term effect
on public knowledge of the Supreme Court and “essentially nil” effect on approval and
disapproval of the Supreme Court).
168. Jamieson & Hennessy, supra note 166, at 900 (finding that “[r]oughly six in 10
Americans (62%) say the courts in their state are legislating from the bench rather than
interpreting the law” and that “75% say a judge’s ruling is influenced by his or her politics to a
great or moderate extent”); Keith Bybee, The Rule of Law Is Dead! Long Live the Rule of Law!
4–5 (Syracuse Univ. Coll. of Law Faculty Scholarship, Paper 56, 2009), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=1404600 (citing a 2005 survey finding that “an astounding 82 percent of those
surveyed believed that the partisan background of judges influences court decisionmaking
either some or a lot” and that “[a] majority of poll respondents agreed that even though judges
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unconvinced by judicial efforts to offer legal opinions adverting to
rule-of-law values. Either way, moving away from the avoidance
maneuver and toward transparent justification in cases of interpretive
choice would not alter the public’s perception of the courts or of the
judicial enterprise.
Even if the general public remains ignorant of the avoidance
maneuver, the attentive public must be considered. When certain
issues come before the courts, attentive segments of the public pay
169
close attention. One might argue that, unlike the general public, this
attentive segment of the public will sometimes care enough about
substantive issues to become informed about the reasoning offered in
170
certain legal opinions. Might the avoidance maneuver preserve or

always say that their decisions flow from the law and the Constitution, many judges are in fact
basing their decisions on their own personal beliefs”).
169. See R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 64–71 (1990)
(discussing and defining the attentive public versus the inattentive public); Stephen B. Burbank,
Alternative Career Resolution II: Changing the Tenure of Supreme Court Justices, 154 U. PA. L.
REV. 1511, 1527 (2006) (commenting that “[s]tudy after study has shown that the public knows
very little about the Court or its decisions, but that levels of awareness differ as between the
attentive public . . . and the nonattentive public”); Doris Graber, Mediated Politics and
Citizenship in the Twenty-First Century, 55 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 545, 563 (2004) (“While
average citizens play important political roles in democracies, the bulk of the burden for
political action has always been born by elected and appointed public officials and by citizens
with above-average interest in politics whom scholars call ‘the attentive public.’ At best, that
category comprises no more than 10% of the citizenry.”); Richard Lehne & John Reynolds, The
Impact of Judicial Activism on Public Opinion, 22 AM. J. POL. SCI. 896, 901 (1978) (noting the
difference between the attentive and the inattentive public and explaining that “[a]n unusually
controversial court decision appears able to cross the attention threshold of some of those for
whom the judicial system is not a matter of everyday concern”); see also Jon A. Krosnick,
Government Policy and Citizen Passion: A Study of Issue Publics in Contemporary America, 12
POL. BEHAV. 59, 72–75 (1990) (discussing the hypothesis that only small segments of the public
will likely care about any given policy issue).
170. Alternatively, the attentive public may care primarily about the substance of Supreme
Court decisions and relatively little about whether they are driven by extant legal principles or
by extralegal considerations. For example, public reaction to Bush v. Gore predictably split
sharply along party lines. Kritzer, supra note 166, at 36. Presumably, if substantive outcomes
were not central to the public’s reaction, then the divide between favorable and unfavorable
evaluations would not have split so clearly along partisan lines. The strong negative public
reaction to the 2005 Supreme Court decision on eminent domain, Kelo v. City of New London,
545 U.S. 469 (2005), is also consistent with the idea that substance is more important than legal
reasoning in the attentive public’s evaluation. Kelo applied existing legal principles on eminent
domain. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 664 (3d ed.
2006). Nonetheless, Kelo “generated a massive backlash from across the political spectrum.”
Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV.
2100, 2101 (2009). If the attentive public is more concerned with substantive outcomes than the
intricacies of the justifications offered in judicial opinions, then the avoidance maneuver’s
impact on attentive segments of the public will be of minimal significance.
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enhance the legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking in the eyes of
attentive segments of the public?
The problem that the avoidance maneuver encounters with the
attentive public is the same problem that it faces with other attentive
constituencies—lawyers and their clients. In the rare instances when
the attentive public cares enough about substantive legal or policy
issues to delve into the particulars of judicial reasoning, the attentive
public will quickly recognize the avoidance maneuver as artifice.
Lawyers have strong professional incentives to pay close attention to
the reasoning of judicial opinions. Their duty to render competent
legal representation requires it. Whether out of economic or other
motivations, members of the attentive public may also develop strong
reasons to pay attention to the particulars of judicial reasoning. If and
when members of the attentive public acquaint themselves with the
details of judicial reasoning, they will likely come to the same
understandings as lawyers who study judicial opinions out of
professional necessity.
With the IDEA § 1415 fee-shifting provision, for example,
parents of children with disabilities may be motivated to acquaint
themselves with the IDEA, and even with cases interpreting the
IDEA. If members of this attentive public were to read the various
IDEA federal court opinions, three points would become just as
conspicuous to them as to any lawyer reviewing the cases to prepare
for professional representation: First, some federal court opinions
applied text over conflicting legislative-intent injunctive interpretive
principles. Second, other federal court opinions applied legislative
intent over conflicting textual injunctive interpretive principles.
Third, despite explicit or implicit claims to the contrary, no federal
court was able to establish a definitive and indisputable ordering
principle governing whether unambiguous text or contrary
unambiguous legislative intent should prevail. Like attorneys, the
attentive portion of the public would thus come to understand that
the outcome in a case of interpretive choice does not depend on the
law of interpretation, but rather on legally unconstrained judicial
171
discretion and extralegal considerations.

171. Consider two constitutional cases, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Bush v. Gore,
that have generated close and impassioned attention from interested segments of the public. It
is unlikely that the losing attentive interest groups were convinced that the law had decided the
outcomes in those cases. In both instances, the groups likely believed that legally unconstrained
judicial discretion and extralegal considerations were determinative.
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Ultimately, the supposed legitimacy-preserving benefits of the
avoidance maneuver depend on the notion that no one will notice its
sleight of hand. And, for the most part, no one will notice. The
general public simply does not get involved in the minutiae of the
reasoning or the justifications offered in judicial opinions. But for
those who are paying attention—attorneys and their clients or an
attentive segment of the public—the sleight of hand is too noticeable
and, therefore, is unlikely to succeed.
Whereas the legitimacy-enhancing benefits of the avoidance
maneuver are speculative at best, the costs associated with
transparent justification are minimal or even nonexistent. Again,
transparent justification itself is not at odds with or contrary to ruleof-law values. The nature of the law of interpretation, with its lack of
ordering principles, generates interpretive choices and scenarios
under which the law of interpretation cannot fully determine
outcomes. Transparent justification would not produce this state of
affairs but would instead merely acknowledge its existence.
Just as the avoidance maneuver preserves the legitimacy of
judicial decisionmaking only if it succeeds in deceiving relevant
audiences, transparent justification damages the legitimacy of judicial
decisionmaking only if it offers relevant audiences damaging
information that they did not previously know. But transparent
justification does not provide any information that interested
audiences do not already know or that, upon examination, is not
already obvious.
Thus, had the majority and dissenting opinions in Arlington
Central openly stated that the law of interpretation does not
definitively determine whether unambiguous text trumps
unambiguous contrary legislative intent, the opinions would not have
provided any information that the lawyers did not already know, at
least on some level. Attorneys realize and can explain to their clients
that the law of interpretation does not definitively settle whether
unambiguous text or unambiguous legislative intent is superior. They
know that in cases like Arlington Central, the outcome will turn more
on legally unconstrained discretionary decisions of the judges than on
the law of interpretation. The litigation history of Arlington Central
confirms this reality: several opinions privileged the clear text of the
172
IDEA over its contrary but clear legislative history, and other

172. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 79–81, 87–89.
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but no opinion offered an
opinions did the exact opposite,
incontrovertible and authoritative rule determining whether text or
174
contrary intent should prevail.
Courts employing transparent
justification would announce that the law of interpretation does not
determine how a court should interpret the IDEA. Yet because any
attorney who has read the relevant legal materials and accompanying
cases will plainly see this anyway, transparent justification itself would
not erode the legitimacy of courts or judicial decisionmaking any
more than the phenomenon of interpretive choice itself already has.
In the end, most of the merits and demerits of both the
avoidance maneuver and transparent justification turn on the
understandings and intellectual capabilities of the relevant audiences.
On the one hand, assume that lawyers, clients, and attentive
audiences already know or can easily come to understand both that
the law of interpretation is not determinative in cases of interpretive
choice and that courts often exercise legally unconstrained discretion.
In that case, the avoidance maneuver will fail to achieve an illusion of
adherence to rule-of-law values. Transparent justification, in turn, has
no downside cost, as nobody in the relevant audience will be
surprised to be informed that the law of interpretation cannot fully
determine outcomes. On the other hand, assume that lawyers, clients,
and attentive audiences do not realize that courts often exercise
legally unconstrained discretion. In that case, perhaps the avoidance
maneuver will succeed in perpetuating their ignorance and, thereby,
in preserving an illusion of adherence to rule-of-law values.
But could it possibly be true that those few who pay close
attention to the finer points of reasoning and justification offered in
judicial opinions will fail to understand that the law of interpretation
alone does not determine outcomes in cases of interpretive choice?
Those who favor the avoidance maneuver and oppose transparent
justification are put in the difficult position of arguing that practicing
attorneys, their clients, and attentive segments of the public are
ignorant of—or are incapable of discovering—basic and easily
verifiable features of the law of interpretation.

173. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 89–99.
174. See supra notes 76–77.
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C. How the Avoidance Maneuver Erodes the Honesty and Quality of
Judicial Opinions, Diminishes the Legitimacy of Courts, and Fails
To Constrain Discretion
Several additional points speak in favor of transparent
justification and against the avoidance maneuver. First, adherence to
rule-of-law values is but one of several considerations relevant to
175
judicial legitimacy. A judicial decision that genuinely adheres to
rule-of-law values might still lack legitimacy if it produces a dreadful
176
substantive outcome. Similarly, a judicial decision produced by a
denial of due process is of dubious legitimacy, even if it genuinely
177
adheres to other rule-of-law values. The point is not to suggest that
adherence to rule-of-law values is unimportant, but rather that
adherence to rule-of-law values is one of several competing factors
that helps assess the legitimacy of a judicial decision. In their zeal to
create an illusion of adherence to rule-of-law values, courts deploying
the avoidance maneuver seem to have discounted other important
considerations.
Importantly, courts deploying the avoidance maneuver discount
the legitimacy-eroding effects of misrepresenting the law of
interpretation. Even conceding the tenuous proposition that the
avoidance maneuver’s illusion of adherence to rule-of-law values
produces a legitimacy-preserving effect, the avoidance maneuver
requires courts to be dishonest about the nature of the law of
interpretation and the role it plays in determining outcomes. This
dishonesty diminishes or even annuls any purported legitimacy175. Both Professors Joseph Raz and Frank Cross make this point. JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule
of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 210, 228 (1979) (“[The] rule of law . . . . has
always to be balanced against competing claims of other values.”); Frank B. Cross, What Do
Judges Want?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 183, 209 (2009) (reviewing POSNER, supra note 34) (arguing that
“[t]he rule of law is certainly exalted in our society, but [that] its virtue must be kept in
perspective” and that competing values are also important to legitimacy).
176. See Cross, supra note 175, at 209 (arguing that popular preferences or pragmatic
concerns can be as important as adherence to rule-of-law values and, thus, that Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), “were bad decisions even
if they were consistent with the rule of law,” and Brown v. Board of Education, 247 U.S. 483
(1954), “was a good decision even if it was inconsistent with [rule-of-law] value[s]”); Neil S.
Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 971–73 (2008) (discussing how
factors other than fidelity to the rule of law are important to the legitimacy of the courts and
how, in some instances, fidelity to the rule of law can harm the legitimacy of the courts).
177. Imagine, for example, a judge who accepts a bribe in exchange for granting summary
judgment to the bribe offeror. Such a judicial decision would be illegitimate under any
reasonable conception, even if it happened to adhere to the unambiguous requirements of
uncontradicted preexisting legal norms.

GONZALEZ IN PRINTER PROOF

640

11/12/2011 3:36:36 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:583

preserving effect that the avoidance maneuver’s façade of adherence
178
Those who defend the
to rule-of-law values might produce.
avoidance maneuver as a lesser evil when compared with transparent
justification necessarily must argue against candor and in favor of
deception.
Second, the avoidance maneuver is problematic not only because
of what it includes in an opinion—misrepresentation of the law of
interpretation—but also because of what it leaves out: public
discussion of the decisive extralegal factors. By casting the law of
interpretation as determinative, a court avoids discussion of the
extralegal factors that had an influence over the disposition of the
issue at hand. Transparent justification, in contrast, would oblige
courts to publicly account for and discuss these determinative
extralegal factors. In Arlington Central, the law of interpretation
could not have determined whether statutory text or contrary
legislative intent should have prevailed. Yet neither the majority nor
the dissent offered a public discussion of the determinative extralegal
factors. This omission erodes the legitimacy of the Court’s decision.
Consider how the losing litigant in Arlington Central might
analyze the legitimacy of the Court’s decision. The Court’s majority
argued that the law of interpretation favored textualist rather than
intentionalist injunctive principles. Despite the rule-of-law
pretensions in the Court’s opinion, the losing litigant knows that the
law of interpretation did not determine the outcome, that extralegal
considerations drove the Court’s choice, and that in other cases the
179
same Court chose to privilege intent over text. Yet rather than
explicate the determinative extralegal factors, the Court minimized
the role of judicial discretion and extralegal factors and cast its
decision as dictated by the law of interpretation. Losing in litigation is

178. See Idleman, supra note 164, at 1309–10 (“The conventional wisdom . . . is apparently
that candor is an ideal toward which judges should almost always aspire and that any exceptions
to this rule are few and far between. . . . [T]he normative position that judges ought to be
forthcoming in their pronouncements would appear to be virtually unassailable. It might seem
difficult to imagine . . . a theory of judging that would explicitly reject the conventional wisdom
in favor of a view that judges may be anything less than candid.” (footnote omitted)).
179. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133–29 (2000)
(favoring legislative intent over clear contrary statutory text); Anita S. Krishnakumar, The
Hidden Legacy of Holy Trinity Church: The Unique National Institution Canon, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1053, 1081–82 (2009) (“Although the statutory text clearly gave the FDA
authority to regulate ‘drugs’ and ‘devices,’ the Court . . . concluded that Congress could not have
intended . . . to give the FDA authority to regulate, and in effect ban, tobacco products.”
(quoting 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)–(h) (1994 & Supp. III 1998))).
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hard. Losing and realizing that the Court sidestepped a public airing
of the decisive factors and instead offered vaporous legal fictions as a
justification is harder. Had the Court employed transparent
justification rather than the avoidance maneuver, at least the losing
litigant would have had the consolation of a candid public accounting
of the decisive extralegal factors.
Third, transparent justification might do more than the
avoidance maneuver to constrain judicial discretion. An obligation to
offer a public discussion of the extralegal factors that motivated the
selection of certain injunctive interpretive principles might inhibit
courts from relying on certain publicly unacceptable extralegal
considerations. In Arlington Central, for example, had the Court
employed transparent justification, the discussion might have
centered on publicly palatable extralegal factors that would have
bolstered the legitimacy of the decision. For example, as an extralegal
reason for favoring text over contrary legislative intent, the Court
could have said that its approach would create incentives for
180
Congress to engage in more careful legislative drafting. The dissent,
in turn, might have argued that enforcing the most natural textual
meaning would simply create unnecessary work for Congress, which
181
would have to waste time amending the text of the statute.
Although these are extralegal policy considerations, not part of the
law of interpretation, they are nonpartisan, principled, and aimed at
improving the legislative process. As such, these sorts of extralegal
considerations would have been publicly palatable and might have
even bolstered the legitimacy of the Court’s decision.
By contrast, the Justices in the majority presumably would not
have stated that they favored textualist principles over intentionalist
principles merely because the former produced the outcome most
consistent with the politically conservative interest of minimizing the

180. See Elizabeth Garrett, Legal Scholarship in the Age of Legislation, 34 TULSA L.J. 679,
685 n.30 (1999) (discussing and citing works that suggest that textualist statutory interpretation
can improve the legislative process); Michael Herz, Judicial Textualism Meets Congressional
Micromanagement: A Potential Collision in Clean Air Act Interpretation, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 175, 204 (1992) (“One often-cited goal of textualism is to induce Congress to legislate with
care and precision.”).
181. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 113–16 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that the examples of statutory amendments passed by Congress in
response to textualist interpretations counsel against textualism and in favor of intentionalism);
see also Daniel J. Bussel, Textualism’s Failures: A Study of Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions, 53
VAND. L. REV. 887, 909–11 (2000) (finding that textualist bankruptcy code decisions necessitate
congressional override more often than do pragmatic interpretive decisions).
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impact and cost of government regulation. Such a statement would
only have eroded the perceived legitimacy of the Court’s decision.
Because the avoidance maneuver does not oblige courts to publicly
discuss determinative extralegal factors, publicly unacceptable
extralegal factors can determine outcomes far too easily. Transparent
justification, however, might in some instances deter courts from
182
relying on these unacceptable factors.
Fourth and relatedly, transparent justification might push courts
to engage in more careful self-analysis, which could encourage
decisions of higher quality. Under the avoidance maneuver, it is very
easy for courts to simply cite an applicable injunctive interpretive
principle that supports a given interpretation and call it a day.
Transparent justification would instead force courts to ask and
answer additional questions: Does the law of interpretation sanction
competing applicable injunctive interpretive principles? If so, why
should a court choose a particular injunctive interpretive principle—
and consequent interpretation—over a competing injunctive
interpretive principle and consequent interpretation? These
additional questions might push courts to consider angles that they
might not otherwise have considered.
This argument should not be overstated. At the Supreme Court
level, the Justices usually have ample opportunity and incentive to
consider every angle and every potentially applicable interpretive
principle. Some of the opinions issued by lower federal courts on
IDEA § 1415, however, offered no evidence that the courts even
183
considered competing injunctive interpretive principles.
These
opinions are consistent with the notion that the avoidance maneuver
enables courts to engage in a somewhat perfunctory analysis of
applicable principles of interpretation. Had these courts been
operating under the obligations of transparent justification, they
might have engaged in a deeper and more thorough analysis of the
law of interpretation. This, in turn, could only have positive effects on
the quality of their decisions.

182. Judge Richard Posner makes a similar point in defending pragmatic judging. Judge
Posner argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, if judges acknowledge that they often
exercise legally unconstrained discretion, they will be more circumspect in exercising discretion
than if they operate under the false impression that the law dictates outcomes. POSNER, supra
note 34, at 252.
183. Those lower court opinions that deployed the second variation of the avoidance
maneuver by offering no discussion of competing interpretive principles are most consistent
with this idea. See supra text accompanying notes 122–28.
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Finally, if transparent justification engenders deeper analysis of
the law of interpretation, over time it could prompt courts to improve
the law of interpretation, or even to develop now-absent ordering
principles. Currently, the law of interpretation offers little more than
legal platitudes for grappling with interpretive choices. The avoidance
maneuver allows courts to freely select reliance on a text-over-intent
platitude: “[W]hen the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of
the courts at least where the disposition required by the text is not
184
absurd is to enforce it according to its terms.” Alternatively, courts
deploying the avoidance maneuver can freely select an intent-overtext platitude: when “literal application of a statute will produce a
result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its
drafters[,] . . . . the intention of the drafters, rather than the strict
185
language, controls.” Transparent justification would obligate courts
to go beyond these legal platitudes and acknowledge that the law of
interpretation does not resolve interpretive choices. And if courts are
forced to acknowledge the limits of the law of interpretation, they
might develop principled ways for resolving those limits. Thus, were
courts to jettison the avoidance maneuver and employ transparent
justification, courts would be obliged to publicly analyze on a case-bycase basis the merits and demerits of privileging text or contrary
legislative intent. Such analysis could generate principles more clearly
specifying the circumstances under which text will presumptively
trump conflicting legislative intent, and vice versa. These generalized
principles could, over time and in a common-law fashion, congeal into
new ordering principles that are incorporated into the law of
interpretation.
In the end, however, the strongest reasons for favoring
transparent justification have nothing to do with improving the
quality of decisions or the development of ordering principles. To be
sure, these are significant side benefits that might accrue from a shift
to transparent justification. But even ignoring these side benefits, one
single consideration makes transparent justification superior to the
avoidance maneuver: judicial candor. Simply stated, courts should be
expected to offer transparent, honest, and complete descriptions of
184. Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 (2005) (alteration in original) (quoting
Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also supra note 58.
185. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (quoting Griffin v.
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)) (internal quotation mark omitted); see also
supra note 49.
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the law of interpretation in their opinions. When courts deploy the
avoidance maneuver, they fail to live up to this obligation. Instead,
they inaccurately claim or imply that the law of interpretation grants
certain injunctive interpretive principles priority over other injunctive
interpretive principles. A presumption must always stand against
misleading or incomplete descriptive accounts of legal norms in
186
Extraordinary circumstances might justify
judicial opinions.
rebutting that presumption in some situations. The avoidance
maneuver, however, is not reserved for extraordinary circumstances.
It is standard operating procedure in legal opinions that deal with
interpretive choice.
CONCLUSION
This Article has used Arlington Central’s classic conflict between
statutory text and contrary legislative intent to explore fundamental
features of the law of interpretation and the way courts address
interpretive choice. Several central points have been advanced. First,
the law of interpretation does not give courts much aid in resolving
interpretive choices. The law of interpretation sanctions competing
injunctive interpretive principles, but it offers no ordering principles
for resolving conflicts among them. Thus, in Arlington Central, the
law of interpretation left the Supreme Court free to choose between
two opposing interpretations of equal legal validity and force.
Ultimately, legally unconstrained judicial discretion driven by
extralegal factors—rather than the law of interpretation—was
decisive.
Second, although the law of interpretation cannot resolve
interpretive choices, courts nonetheless explicitly or implicitly claim
that it can. In Arlington Central and related lower federal court cases,
none of the opinions acknowledged the central role judicial discretion
and extralegal factors had played in choosing between statutory text
and conflicting legislative intent. Instead, the Justices applied the
avoidance maneuver and claimed that the law of interpretation favors
text over intent, or vice versa. In so doing, the Court misrepresented

186. See Idleman, supra note 164, at 1309 (“[T]he basic rule that judges ought to be candid
in their opinions that they should neither omit their reasoning nor conceal their motives seems
steadfastly to have held its ground.”); Henry P. Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions
Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV. 1, 25 (1979) (arguing that Justices may not actually rely on reasons
not stated in their opinions); David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 731, 736–38 (1987) (arguing that candor is required in judicial opinions).
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the law of interpretation and failed to publicly discuss the pivotal
extralegal factors that had determined whether text or legislative
intent ultimately prevailed.
Third, courts deploy the avoidance maneuver to enable the
reasoning in judicial opinions to adhere to rule-of-law values and
thereby to preserve the legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking.
Opinions responding to interpretive choices with the avoidance
maneuver, however, necessarily misrepresent the law of
interpretation. This misrepresentation diminishes any value derived
from the appearance of adherence to the rule of law.
Finally, given the problems inherent in the avoidance maneuver,
this Article advances transparent justification as an alternative
approach. Unlike the avoidance maneuver, transparent justification
does not misrepresent the law of interpretation. Moreover,
transparent justification would better constrain judicial discretion by
pressing courts to publicly grapple with determinative extralegal
factors. This, in turn, would also encourage courts to develop the
ordering principles that this area of the law lacks. Any rule-of-law
motivation for embracing the avoidance maneuver, or for rejecting
transparent justification, is unconvincing. The mere fact that a court
proclaims that the law of interpretation grants text precedence over
intent, or vice versa, does not make it so. Nor does it persuade anyone
who has reason to scrutinize judicial reasoning in cases involving
interpretive choices. Moreover, admitting that the law of
interpretation does not resolve an interpretive choice does not tell
interested observers anything they do not already know.
This Article began with a series of questions: What should a
court do when the text of a statute strongly points to one statutory
meaning, but strong evidence of legislative intent suggests an entirely
different statutory meaning? Should a court follow the most natural
reading of the text, even though it would upset the expectations of the
enacting legislature? Or should a court adopt a reading that matches
the clearly expressed intent and understanding of the enacting
legislature, even if that reading is at odds with the statutory text?
Ultimately, this Article does not counsel courts to favor either
statutory text or legislative intent. Instead, it simply counsels against
reflexive deployment of the avoidance maneuver. Courts have
overestimated both the legitimacy-preserving effect of the avoidance
maneuver and the legitimacy-eroding effect of transparent
justification. In cases involving interpretive choices, legally
unconstrained judicial discretion and extralegal factors necessarily
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will be decisive. The mode of justification, whether it be avoidance or
transparent justification, cannot alter this essential reality. At the very
least, therefore, the avoidance maneuver should not be so universally
and unquestioningly deployed. Courts should take transparent
justification seriously. If they do, many courts will recognize the
pitfalls of avoidance and the benefits of transparent justification.
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APPENDIX
EXPERT-WITNESS FEES UNDER IDEA § 1415
No.

Case

Type of Court

1

Goldring v. District of Columbia, 416 F.3d 70 (D.C.
Cir. 2005)

Circuit Court

2

Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.,
402 F.3d 332 (2d Cir. 2005), vacated, 548 U.S. 291
(2006)

Circuit Court

3

Mo. Dep’t. of Elementary & Secondary Educ. v.
Springfield R-12 Sch. Dist., 358 F.3d 992 (8th Cir.
2004)

Circuit Court

4

T.D. v. LaGrange Sch. Dist. No. 102, 349 F.3d 469
(7th Cir. 2003)

Circuit Court

5

Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022 (8th
Cir. 2003)

Circuit Court

6

Arons v. N.J. State Bd. of Educ., 842 F.2d 58 (3d
Cir. 1988)

Circuit Court

7

S.W. v. Bridgeton Bd. of Educ., No. Civ. 050043(RBK), 2006 WL 469655 (D.N.J. Feb. 24,
2006)

District Court (Unpublished)

8

P.R. v. Bridgeton Bd. of Educ., No. Civ.A. 0542(FLW), 2006 WL 231665 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2006)

District Court (Unpublished)

9

C.H. ex rel. M.H. v. Jefferson Twp. Bd. of Educ.,
Civil Action No. 05-39 (HAA), 2005 WL 4122172
(D.N.J. Dec. 20, 2005)

District Court (Unpublished)

10

Burgess v. Paterson Bd. of Educ., No. Civ. 04-2620,
2005 WL 2290290 (D.N.J. Sept. 20, 2005)

District Court (Unpublished)

11

Riggins v. Millville Bd. of Educ., No. Civ. 043575(RBK), 2005 WL 1863666 (D.N.J. Aug. 2,
2005)

District Court (Unpublished)

12

Goldring v. District of Columbia, No. Civ.A.02-1761
JDB, 2005 WL 3294005 (D.D.C. May 26, 2005)

District Court (Unpublished)

13

Czarniewy v. District of Columbia, No. Civ.A. 021496(HHK), 2005 WL 692081 (D.D.C. Mar. 25,
2005)

District Court (Unpublished)

14

Bd. of Educ. v. I.S. ex rel. Summers, 358 F. Supp. 2d
462 (D. Md. 2005)

District Court (Published)

15

Hiram C. v. Manteca Unified Sch. Dist., No. S-032568 WBS KJM, 2004 WL 4999156 (E.D. Cal.
Nov. 5, 2004)

District Court (Unpublished)

16

Goldring v. District of Columbia, No. Civ.A.02-1761
JDB, 2004 WL 3608893 (D.D.C. July 21, 2004)

District Court (Unpublished)
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Case

Type of Court

17

Noyes v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 331 F.
Supp. 2d 1233 (S.D. Cal. 2004)

District Court (Published)

18

Arons v. New York, No. 04 Civ. 0004 (DLC), 2004
WL 1124669 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2004)

District Court (Unpublished)

19

Mr. & Mrs. S. v. Timberlane Reg’l Sch. Dist., No.
Civ. 03-260-JD, 2004 WL 502614 (D.N.H. Mar.
15, 2004)

District Court (Unpublished)

20

Gross ex rel. Gross v. Perrysburg Exempted Vill.
Sch. Dist., 306 F. Supp. 2d 726 (N.D. Ohio 2004)

District Court (Published)

21

Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.,
No. 99 Civ. 9294(CSH), 2003 WL 21694398
(S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2003), aff’d, 402 F.3d 332 (2d
Cir. 2005), vacated, 548 U.S. 291 (2006)

District Court (Unpublished)

22

Brillon ex rel. Brillon v. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist., 274
F. Supp. 2d 864 (S.D. Tex. 2003), rev’d in part,
100 Fed. App’x 309 (5th Cir. 2004)

District Court (Published)

23

R.E. v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., Dist. 2, No. 02 Civ.
1067(DC), 2003 WL 42017 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6,
2003)

District Court (Unpublished)

24

T.D. v. LaGrange Sch. Dist. No. 102, 222 F. Supp.
2d 1062 (N.D. Ill. 2002), rev’d in part, 349 F.3d
469 (7th Cir. 2003)

District Court (Published)

25

DiBuo v. Bd. of Educ. of Worcester Cnty., No. Civ.
S 01-1311, 2002 WL 32909389 (D. Md. Jan. 23,
2002)

District Court (Unpublished)

26

Brandon K. ex rel. Larry K. v. New Lenox Sch.
Dist., No. 01 C 4625, 2001 WL 34049887 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 3, 2001), vacated, DiBuo ex rel. DiBuo v. Bd.
of Educ., 309 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 2002)

District Court (Unpublished)

27

Brandon K. v. New Lenox Sch. Dist., No. 01 C 4625,
2001 WL 1491499 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 23, 2001)

District Court (Unpublished)

28

B.D. v. DeBuono, 177 F. Supp. 2d 201 (S.D.N.Y.
2001)

District Court (Published)

29

Pazik v. Gateway Reg’l Sch. Dist., 130 F. Supp. 2d
217 (D. Mass. 2001)

District Court (Published)

30

P.G. v. Brick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 124 F. Supp. 2d 251
(D.N.J. 2000)

District Court (Published)

31

Mr. J. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 2d 226 (D. Conn.
2000)

District Court (Published)

32

Woodside v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., No.
CIV. A. 99-1830, 2000 WL 92096 (E.D. Pa. Jan.
27, 2000)

District Court (Unpublished)

33

P.L. ex rel. L. v. Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 64 F. Supp.
2d 61 (D. Conn. 1999)

District Court (Published)

34

Mayo v. Booker, 56 F. Supp. 2d 597 (D. Md. 1999)

District Court (Published)
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35

Mr. & Mrs. B. ex rel. W.B. v. Weston Bd. of Educ.,
34 F. Supp. 2d 777 (D. Conn. 1999)

District Court (Published)

36

Dale M. ex rel. Alice M. v. Bd. of Educ. of BradleyBourbonnais High Sch. Dist. No. 307, 29 F. Supp.
2d 925 (C.D. Ill. 1998), rev’d, 237 F.3d 813 (7th
Cir. 2001)

District Court (Published)

37

Eirschele v. Craven Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 7 F. Supp.
2d 655 (E.D.N.C. 1998)

District Court (Published)

38

B.K. v. Toms River Bd. of Educ., 998 F. Supp. 462
(D.N.J. 1998)

District Court (Published)

39

S.D. v. Manville Bd. of Educ., 989 F. Supp. 649
(D.N.J. 1998)

District Court (Published)

40

C.G. ex rel. Mr. & Mrs. G. v. New Haven Bd. of
Educ., 988 F. Supp. 60 (D. Conn. 1997)

District Court (Published)

41

Cynthia K. v. Bd. of Educ. of Lincoln-Way High
Sch. Dist., No. 95 C 7172, 1996 WL 164381 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 1, 1996)

District Court (Unpublished)

42

Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 283, St. Louis Park, Minn. v.
S.D., 948 F. Supp. 892 (D. Minn. 1996)

District Court (Published)

43

E.M. v. Millville Bd. of Educ., 849 F. Supp. 312
(D.N.J. 1994)

District Court (Published)

44

Bailey v. District of Columbia, 839 F. Supp. 888, 892
(D.D.C. 1993), abrogated by Fischer ex rel.
Fischer v. District of Columbia, 517 F.3d 570
(D.D.C. 2008)

District Court (Published)

45

Aranow v. District of Columbia, 780 F. Supp. 46
(D.D.C.1992)

District Court (Published)

46

Field v. Haddonfield Bd. of Educ., 769 F. Supp.
1313 (D.N.J. 1991)

District Court (Published)

